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Federalism, Convergence, and Divergence
in Constitutional Property
GERALD S. DICKINSON*
Federal law exerts a gravitational force on state actors,
resulting in widespread conformity to federal law and doctrine at the state level. This has been well recognized in the
literature, but scholars have paid little attention to this phenomenon in the context of constitutional property. Traditionally, state takings jurisprudence—in both eminent domain
and regulatory takings—has strongly gravitated towards the
Supreme Court’s takings doctrine. This long history of federal-state convergence, however, was disrupted by the
Court’s controversial public use decision in Kelo v. City of
New London. In the wake of Kelo, states resisted the Court’s
validation of the economic development justification for
public use, instead choosing to impose expansive private
property protections beyond the federal minima. This resistance thus raises a fundamental puzzle: despite the fracturing of public use doctrine following Kelo, states continue
to converge around the force of and be lured by the Court’s
regulatory takings jurisprudence. Why is this? This Article
argues that the most persuasive explanation is the political
economy; that is, where homeowners are perceived to be underprotected by Supreme Court decisions, state actors are
more likely to diverge from federal doctrine to grant greater
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protections as opposed to when the challenger is a developer-landowner. The Court has not underprotected a homeowner in a regulatory takings challenge in a manner that
would spark a similar post-Kelo state resistance. Few scholars have explored this mystery and offered conceptual and
doctrinal explanations on the value of state divergence from
federal takings doctrine in our federalist regime.
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INTRODUCTION
The American system of federalism has created a phenomenon
known as “the gravitational force of federal law.”1 This phenomenon influences state actors to behave in ways that usually conform
to, rather than diverge from, Supreme Court jurisprudence.2 Many
state legislatures have enacted statutes that mimic congressional
acts.3 Further, state constitutions imitate the federal Constitution,4
and state courts regularly decide cases by following Supreme Court
precedent.5 Even the Supreme Court’s interpretive methodology of
statutory and constitutional provisions has been reproduced into
state laws and constitutions.6 These methodologies deeply influence

1

Scott Dodson, The Gravitational Force of Federal Law, 164 U. PA. L. REV.
703, 725–26 (2016) (explaining that state courts have a tendency to decide issues
of state law by mimicking federal court interpretations of analogous federal law).
2
In this Article, I refer to state actors as state legislatures and state courts.
3
See infra Section I.A.
4
State constitutions do, of course, differ from the federal Constitution in
many ways. State constitutions, unlike their federal counterpart, are often far more
detailed, and include quite a bit of policy-related provisions that the federal Constitution ignores, such as public education and family law. Still, state constitutions
include fundamental rights and the core amendments of the federal Constitution.
See generally JAMES A. GARDNER, INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS: A JURISPRUDENCE OF FUNCTION IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM (2005); Frank P. Grad, The
State Constitution: Its Function and Form for Our Time, 54 VA. L. REV. 928
(1968); Justin Long, Intermittent State Constitutionalism, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 41
(2006); Jim Rossi, The Puzzle of State Constitutions, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 211 (2006)
(reviewing GARDNER, supra); Mila Versteeg & Emily Zackin, American Constitutional Exceptionalism Revisited, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1641 (2014).
5
See Dodson, supra note 1, at 711–19.
6
See Alex B. Long, “If the Train Should Jump the Track . . .”: Divergent
Interpretations of State and Federal Employment Discrimination Statutes, 40 GA.
L. REV. 469, 478 (2006) (examining state interpretation of “borrowed” federal
employment statutes).
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state court decision-making frameworks and tiers of scrutiny in constitutional jurisprudence.7
Although this much is relatively well known, scholars have paid
little attention to this phenomenon in the context of constitutional
property.8 States prefer to follow, rather than diverge from, the Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence.9 This Article offers empirical
evidence to suggest that this phenomenon exists within both veins
of the Takings Clause10—regulatory takings and eminent domain.11
For example, the Supreme Court’s regulatory takings jurisprudence,
with all its imperfections, seems to lure states into its doctrinal orbit.
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon was the catalyst for state courts’

7

See Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology
as “Law” and the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE. L.J. 1898, 1915–16 (2011).
8
James E. Krier & Stewart E. Sterk, An Empirical Study of Implicit Takings,
58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 35, 35 (2016).
9
See infra Section II.A.
10
U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides “nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” Id.
11
This Article’s inquiry focuses primarily on some state appellate court rulings, but mostly state supreme court rulings on regulatory takings and eminent
domain challenges, to substantiate the claim that conformity to federal takings
doctrine is the rule, and that Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) is
a rare exception in constitutional property that caused states to diverge from
longstanding Supreme Court public use jurisprudence. See Krier & Sterk, supra
note 8, at 39 (2016) (finding that “in certain circumstances state courts tend to
provide less protection to private property than Supreme Court doctrine requires,
though they, and some state legislatures, occasionally provide more”); infra Part
II. There are several other cautionary observations to note in this Article. Many
cases are never appealed to state appellate courts. See Thomas W. Merrill, The
Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 94 n.105 (1986); see also
George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13
J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 (1984) (noting that surveys show that between 0.09% and
0.2% of claims are pursued through appeal). I focus on eminent domain challenges regarding public use since Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) from
1954 to 2017 and regulatory taking challenges since Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) from 1922 to 2017. Admittedly, this is not an exhaustive empirical study of regulatory takings or “implicit takings” of the kind
that Krier and Sterk conducted. See Krier & Sterk, supra note 8, at 50.

2018]

FEDERALISM, CONVERGENCE, AND DIVERGENCE

143

embrace of Justice Holmes’s doctrinal prescription for overly burdensome regulations.12 Later takings rulings from the Court compounded the complexity of the doctrine.13 Still, state actors have preferred to follow14 the doctrinal script like a thematic play that only
seems to get more confusing with each passing Supreme Court
term.15 Likewise, the public use vein of the Takings Clause has also
had a preeminent influence over state actors.16 The Supreme Court’s
ruling in Berman v. Parker defined the modern-day takings doctrine;
it gave broad discretion to local governments to take private property for almost any conceivable public use.17 The Court followed
years later with Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, which af-

12

260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922); see Robert Brauneis, “The Foundation of Our
‘Regulatory Takings’ Jurisprudence”: The Myth and Meaning of Justice
Holmes’s Opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 106 YALE L.J. 613, 615–
16 (1996).
13
See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1064 (1992) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (stating that barring a landowner from constructing habitable structures on land after the landowner purchased it can constitute a taking because it
“denies [the landowner] economically viable use of [the] land” (quoting Agins v.
City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980), abrogated by Lingle v. Chevron
U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 532 (2005))); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982) (holding that statute allowing a cable
company to place permanent cable facilities on landowner’s property constitutes
a taking because it is “a permanent physical occupation of property”); Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 136–38 (1978) (holding that designating landowners’ train station as a historical landmark is not a taking because
it “does not interfere in any way with the [land’s] present uses” or prevent landowner from “obtain[ing] a ‘reasonable return’ on its investment”).
14
See infra Part II.
15
Richard A. Epstein, Disappointed Expectations: How the Supreme Court
Failed to Clean up Takings Law in Murr v. Wisconsin, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY
151, 154 (2017) (noting that “with each new doctrinal tweak, the level of gloom
and confusion only increases as the Justices struggle to fit each new piece of the
puzzle into a framework that has become less tidy and less satisfactory with each
new iteration”).
16
See infra Part II.
17
348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (“[T]he legislature, not the judiciary, is the main
guardian of the public needs to be served by social legislation . . . .”).
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firmed and strengthened its deferential treatment of physical seizures.18 State actors have rarely resisted or diverted from the doctrinal rubrics offered by the Supreme Court.19
This Article offers new insight into federalist dimensions in takings jurisprudence by exploring why this omnipotent convergence
of state actors to federal takings doctrine exists. Part of the narrative
of conformity is that the Court’s takings doctrine, like other areas of
constitutional law, sets the constitutional baseline.20 But takings
doctrine, unlike other areas of constitutional law, measures the constitutional bottom against the background of state property law.21
Thus, at a minimum, all state takings law presumably starts at the
bottom and may, if state actors choose, go below the floor (few have
done this),22 raise the ceiling, or conform to the existing baseline.23
States are not preemptively bound by or tied to the Court’s constitutional floor.24 The Supreme Court expressly offers states “extraordinary latitude” in implementing law and defining and developing
doctrine that goes above and beyond the baseline.25 States are by no
means coerced into cautious legislative and judicial behavior.26
18

467 U.S. 229, 239–42 (1984).
See infra Part II.
20
Id.
21
Krier & Sterk, supra note 8, at 38; Stewart E. Sterk, The Federalist Dimension of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence, 114 YALE L.J. 203, 206 (2004).
22
See Krier & Sterk, supra note 8, at 39 (noting that “[o]ur review indicates
that in certain circumstances state courts tend to provide less protection to private
property than Supreme Court doctrine requires, though they, and some state legislatures, occasionally provide more”). However, it should be noted that choosing
to go below the floor of protections set by the Supreme Court is constitutionally
impermissible. See Michael E. Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of State
Courts in the Twenty-First Century, 35 IND. L. REV. 335, 357 (2002). Yet, as Krier
and Sterk explain, some state courts regularly “reflect ignorance of—or indifference to—Supreme Court teachings, which in any event place virtually no significant constraints on state activities regarding property.” Krier & Sterk, supra note
8, at 39.
23
See infra Part I.
24
See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458–59 (1991) (explaining that the
Framers contemplated “a healthy balance of power between the States and the
Federal Government”).
25
Krier & Sterk, supra note 8, at 50.
26
See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (“[B]ecause the
States are independent sovereigns in our federal system, we have long presumed
that Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of action.”).
19
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Nevertheless, while state actors may divert from federal takings doctrine by providing more or less protections to landowners, many do
not.27
Instead, many state courts seem to take the safest route to dispositions by evaluating state takings actions using the interpretive
methodologies and tests set forth by the Supreme Court, but decline
to provide protections above the federal minima.28 Meanwhile, legislatures craft state takings statutes in conformity with the Court’s
constitutional commands.29 In other words, it is one thing for states
to copy and paste federal takings provisions into state constitutions
or to mimic the Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence by applying
it to state takings provisions. It is another for state takings legislation
to decline to enact laws that offer more private property protections
to landowners and for state courts to rarely apply the Court’s doctrinal tests in a manner that expands protections to landowners.30
This Article is equally concerned with a rare schism in the
longstanding conformity in public use doctrine at the state level.
Kelo v. City of New London is the notable exception where state divergence from this longstanding gravitational conformity caused a
rift in constitutional property immediately following the Supreme
Court’s ruling. It is in Kelo that we find state conformity to takings
doctrine to rupture along the public use line of the doctrine, as opposed to regulatory takings.31 The ruling famously triggered a widespread political and judicial backlash.32 This centrifugal episode
marked a distinct moment in constitutional property. The majority

27

See infra Part II.
Id.
29
Id.
30
See Krier & Sterk, supra note 8, at 39.
31
See infra Section II.B.
32
There is no need to revisit the backlash in state legislatures and state courts
here, as Ilya Somin has already provided excellent coverage of the ongoing developments since the Kelo decision. See generally Ilya Somin, Controlling the
Grasping Hand: Economic Development Takings After Kelo, 15 SUP. CT. ECON.
REV. 183, 254 n.373 (2007) [hereinafter Somin, Grasping Hand]; Ilya Somin, Is
Post-Kelo Eminent Domain Reform Bad for the Poor?, 101 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 195, 196–200 (2007) [hereinafter Somin, Post-Kelo Reform]; Ilya Somin,
The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 MINN. L.
REV. 2100, 2108–54 (2009) [hereinafter Somin, Limits of Backlash].
28
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of states concluded that the Supreme Court got it wrong,33 that economic development justifications for eminent domain underprotected landowners,34 specifically homeowners, and that the Court
applied its jurisprudence “without the slightest nod to [the] original
meaning [of the Takings Clause],” as Justice Thomas put it.35 Such
widespread resistance was followed by a string of state supreme
court rulings, along with state constitutional amendments, banning
or limiting economic development takings, effectively announcing
widespread state resistance to federal takings law.36 Indeed, we arrive at this unusual episode of divergence in light of decades of conformity to federal takings doctrine. Prior to Kelo, there were few
instances where states specifically granted greater protections to private property beyond the “constitutional bottom” constructed by the
Supreme Court and contemplated in the Takings Clause.37
This rare instance of divergence raises a fundamental puzzle:
despite the fracturing of public use doctrine following Kelo, states
continue to converge around the gravitational force of the Supreme
Court’s regulatory takings jurisprudence.38 Nothing in the Kelo decision spurred state legislatures nor state courts to revisit their regulatory takings legislation and doctrine.39 Given Kelo was a physical
seizure and not a regulatory taking,40 this legislative inaction is not
surprising, but it is still telling. Why has convergence in regulatory
takings doctrine continued despite massive resistance in public use?
The chaotic fissure in constitutional property created by the Kelo
decision offers an opportunity to sketch some of the reasons and explanations for the abrupt divergence. Indeed, some preliminary explanations abound.41
33

See Somin, Limits of Backlash, supra note 32, at 2101–02 (“[F]orty-three
states have enacted post-Kelo reform legislation to curb eminent domain.”).
34
Somin, Grasping Hand, supra note 32, at 223 (noting “the unpopularity of
economic development takings”).
35
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 506 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
36
See Somin, Limits of Backlash, supra note 32, at 2114–54.
37
John Ferejohn & Barry Friedman, Toward a Political Theory of Constitutional Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 825, 853 (2006) (noting that Supreme
Court prescriptions create a constitutional bottom that leaves room for more
rights-protective action by the states).
38
See infra Part II.
39
See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 477–90.
40
Id. at 475–76.
41
See infra Section III.B.
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Might it be that states, like those lured by the Court’s Berman
and Mahon rulings, were simply influenced (or swept up) by countervailing waves of resistance in the moment?42 Or perhaps it is just
a question of legislative loyalty and state court deference to the
many amendments by legislatures that restricted or banned economic development takings.43 It could also be state actors preference for horizontal uniformity over vertical uniformity in the public
use vein to give the impression of institutional legitimacy in takings
doctrine.44 Similarly, one argument is that the divergence post-Kelo
was a nod to state and local institutional competence to deal with
questions of public use rather than federal actors.45
This Article argues that the most persuasive explanation, however, is that the divergence and convergence dichotomy post-Kelo
boils down to the political economy.46 That is, where homeowners
are perceived to be underprotected by Supreme Court decisions,
such as Ms. Kelo from the Kelo decision, states may be more likely
to diverge from federal doctrine to grant greater protections as opposed to when the plaintiff is a developer-landowner in a regulatory
takings challenge.
Indeed, a lack of protections to the “home” has caused, at least
in the post-Kelo era, divergence, while failure to vindicate other
property interests maintains conformity at the state level.47 This
yields a dichotomy in the gravitational force of federal constitutional
property between strong conceptions of “core” property rights for
homeowners and lesser protections from regulation for commercial
developers or owners of undeveloped land.48 It is unlikely that states
will engage in a countervailing resistance movement against federal
regulatory takings doctrine without a seismic ruling by the Supreme

42

Id.
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id. To the best of my knowledge, this Article is the first to argue that political economy is the defining explanation for the state divergence that has subsequently led to a schism between regulatory takings doctrine and public use doctrine in constitutional property post-Kelo.
47
See infra Section II.B.4.
48
Id.
43
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Court that upholds a regulation that underprotects a plaintiff homeowner.
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I explains the concept
of the gravitational force of federal law to provide a framework and
some background on the influence that federal law has on the states.
Part II explores the empirical evidence of whether Supreme
Court takings doctrine lures states into its orbit. The answer is yes,
for the most part. State actors have responded to the Court’s regulatory takings and public use doctrine since Berman and Mahon by
generally following the Court’s jurisprudential commands. But, this
Part also unpacks one notable exception—a rupture of sorts—in the
longstanding convergence in takings that occurred after the Kelo ruling. The ruling and subsequent nationwide backlash raises a unique
dichotomy in constitutional property, where states have shown a
willingness to diverge from the Court’s public use doctrine, but slavishly continue to follow its regulatory takings vein.49 This Part also
explains that the political economy—perceived underprotection of
homeowners—is most likely the reason for divergence in public use
post-Kelo.
Part III offers additional conceptual and doctrinal explanations
for why state courts tend to follow the Court’s takings jurisprudence
when that is by no means required. Part III also offers alternative
explanations beyond political economy for why the Kelo ruling
caused one of the great state departures from federal doctrine in constitutional law.
Part IV unpacks normative implications for the contemporary
disequilibrium between regulatory takings and public use doctrine
at the state level. Many areas of constitutional law have experienced
some variation of convergence and divergence amongst the states.50
Yet, the breadth and depth of the divergence after the Kelo decision
separates constitutional property from other areas of constitutional
law. While scholars have debated the merits of the Kelo decision
and weighed the ruling’s doctrinal and historical implications,51
49

Cf. Dodson, supra note 1, at 726 (“But, for the most part, state courts construe their own state constitutional protections in lockstep with the Supereme
Court’s interpretation of analogous federal provisions, slavishly incorporating the
Supreme Court’s doctrinal standards and buzzwords.”).
50
See infra Section II.B.
51
See, e.g., Krier & Sterk, supra note 8, at 35; Somin, Grasping Hand, supra
note 32; Somin, Limits of Backlash, supra note 32.
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none has ever offered explanations for both the convergence and the
unusually chaotic episode of post-Kelo divergence that reveals such
a stark disequilibrium in constitutional property. This Article concludes that more divergence of the sort witnessed post-Kelo, especially in the regulatory takings vein, is healthy for federalism and
may be more appropriate in areas of constitutional property than
other veins of constitutional law given the strong theme of background state laws.
I. GRAVITATIONAL FORCE OF FEDERAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. Federal Statutes and State Following
Federal law exerts a certain force that lures states into governing,
regulating, and administering laws using federal law as the blueprint.52 This gravitational pull has a peculiar influence over state
constitutional law and state legislative enactments, particularly
where obedience is not compelled or required by Congress or the
Supreme Court.53 It is a pervasive force that extends to both procedural and substantive state law.54 While states, as sovereigns, may
experiment and exercise independence in constitutionalism, they
have seemed timid and cautious in exercising their latitude to divert
from federal pronouncements, and often times simply comply with
federal law, even when it is not mandated.55 Scholars have offered
competing explanations for uniformity and convergence in federal
and constitutional law.56 Constitutional autonomy, once promoted

52

See Dodson, supra note 1, at 705.
Id.
54
See id. at 707–29.
55
Id. at 725 (citing James A. Gardner, Autonomy and Isomorphism: The Unfulfilled Promise of Structural Autonomy in American State Constitutions, 60
WAYNE L. REV. 31, 34 (2014) (noting that the United States Constitution and state
constitutions “tend to converge strongly”)).
56
See id. at 729–30 (“The most benign explanation is that federal law gets
the law right first, and state actors, realizing this, follow as a matter of agreement
and judgment. . . . [But,] explanations for state isomorphism generally, and in
specific instances, need deeper theorizing.”).
53
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by the likes of Justice Louis Brandeis57 and Justice William Brennan,58 simply has not materialized.59
Federal employment discrimination laws are a primary example.
They tend to generate state behavior that cautiously mimics interpretive methodologies for federal statutory law and federal case
law.60 Soon after Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title
VII”) was enacted, “all . . . states that previously lacked antidiscrimination statutes adopted them,”61 thus setting the stage for federal
law to become the standard-bearer “for individual rights in the employment context, with state legislatures and courts taking their cues
from federal law.”62 The passage of these laws caused states to engage in a high level of mimicry by enacting substantially similar
laws that imitated the provisions of Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).63 There are also examples of how states have
mimicked federal procedural laws. For example, the adoption of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938 “wrenched the states off
their traditional courses” to either mirror or mimic the federal
rules.64 The Federal Rules of Evidence, likewise, also permeate
throughout the states.65
Indeed, where legislation is similarly drafted, state courts tend
to interpret state legislation along the same lines as federal courts.66
In fact, some state legislation “require[s] conforming interpretation

57

See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 440–21 (1922) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
58
See William J. Brennan, Jr. State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977) [hereinafter Brennan, State Constitutions].
59
Dodson, supra note 1, at 725.
60
Scholars have explored this federal-state relationship. Id. at 720 n.79 (citing Long, supra note 6; Sandra F. Sperino, Revitalizing State Employment Discrimination Law, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 545 (2013)).
61
Sally F. Goldfarb, The Supreme Court, the Violence Against Women Act,
and the Use and Abuse of Federalism, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 57, 91 (2002).
62
Long, supra note 6, at 478.
63
Id. at 424–25.
64
Dodson, supra note 1, at 710.
65
See 6 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE, at T-1 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2015).
66
See Dodson, supra note 1, at 721 (citing Long, supra note 6, at 473).
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with federal precedent.”67 As Scott Dodson notes, “state courts typically conform to federal court interpretations of federal statutes
with relatively paltry analysis of countervailing considerations.”68
And, as Alex Long mentions, “state courts sometimes appear to
bend over backwards in construing state antidiscrimination statutes
in order to keep state and federal law on the same track.”69 Even
when the language and text of state legislation is different from federal statutes, states tend to “finesse the textual differences where
they exist.”70 However, this phenomenon is not universal or uniform
across the board. There are plenty of examples of states diverging
from federal law.71 Some states, for instance, provide greater protections to employees claiming discrimination.72 From a methodological standpoint, a number of state appellate courts have declined
to follow federal court interpretations of employment discrimination
statutes when interpreting identical state statutes.73 Indeed, while
there is significant conformity, it is prudent to note that there does
not exist wholesale conformity across the spectrum of federal and
state law. There are exceptions, but on the whole scholars have
found substantial convergence between federal doctrine and legislation at the state level.

67

Dodson, supra note 1, at 721 n.87 (emphasis added) (citing Long, supra
note 6, at 477).
68
Dodson, supra note 1, at 721 (citing Long, supra note 6, at 477).
69
Long, supra note 6, at 477; see also Dodson, supra note 1, at 722–23 (discussing the doctrinal nuances of state conformity to federal courts’ interpretations
of antidiscrimination doctrine).
70
Long, supra note 6, at 495.
71
Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9 (1988) (identifying many
federal programs that have origins at a state level); Myron T. Steele & Peter I.
Tsoflias, Realigning the Constitutional Pendulum, 77 ALB. L. REV. 1365, 1375
(2015) (identifying and discussing states with broader constitutional protections
of civil liberties, including free speech and privacy rights); Benjamin J. Beaton,
Note, Walking the Federalist Tightrope: A National Policy of State Experimentation for Health Information Technology, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1670, 1688–93
(2008) (explaining the development of health information technology policy at
the state level where federal action had been lacking).
72
See Goldfarb, supra note 61, at 91.
73
See Long, supra note 6, at 473–74.
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B. The Federal Constitution and State Constitutionalism
Federal constitutional law also emits a certain preeminent influence over state constitutions and state court interpretations of federal
doctrine.74 This has been a bit puzzling to some scholars.75 Almost
every state has an equal protection clause that is analyzed using the
same levels of scrutiny that the Supreme Court has developed to analyze the federal Equal Protection Clause.76 Some state supreme
courts simply do not distinguish between state and federal constitutions in their analysis of the guarantee of freedom of speech.77 Thus,
the First Amendment analytical framework provided by the Supreme Court provides the backbone standards against which state
and local enactments are to be measured.78
In the 1990s, several scholars explored whether state doctrine
complied with federal doctrine and the interpretive methodologies
of the United States Supreme Court.79 These scholars found that
state courts had been “engag[ing] in an analysis in lockstep with
their federal counterparts,”80 except in the areas of free exercise of
religion, right to trial by jury, and search and seizure.81 In these three
areas, more than half of the state court rulings departed from traditional convergence, and instead chose to grant greater protections to
certain rights.82 In other words, the majority of state courts, on most
74

Dodson, supra note 1, at 724.
See, e.g., id.
76
See id. at 726. There are, however, some “pockets of state independence, . . . such as discrete areas of constitutional criminal law.” Id.
77
See, e.g., Pick v. Nelson, 528 N.W.2d 309, 317 (Neb. 1995) (“[W]e do not
distinguish between the two constitutions in our analysis of this issue.”).
78
Sterk, supra note 21, at 206.
79
Solimine, supra note 22, at 338.
80
Id.; see also James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 761, 766 (1992) [hereinafter Gardner, Failed Discourse]; Barry Latzer, The Hidden Conservatism of the State Court “Revolution,”
74 JUDICATURE 190, 190 (1991).
81
Solimine, supra note 22, at 338–39.
82
James N.G. Cauthen, Expanding Rights Under State Constitutions: A
Quantitative Appraisal, 63 ALB. L. REV. 1183, 1196 (2000). The study examined
627 state supreme court decisions chosen from a randomized selection of states
that covered states’ Bills of Rights in nineteen issue areas. Id. at 1191–94. But,
criminal procedure is one area where there is divergence with federal law. See
David C. Brody, Criminal Procedure Under State Law: An Empirical Examination of Selective New Federalism, 23 JUST. SYS. J. 75, 79 (2002) (finding that that
75
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issues, engaged in an analysis that was the same or substantially
similar to their federal counterparts.83 Michael Solimine notes that
“when presented with the opportunity, [state courts] have chosen not
to depart from federal precedents when interpreting the rights-granting provisions of state constitutions.”84 Invariably, the American
federalist system has allowed the Supreme Court’s interpretations of
the Constitution to have an “overwhelming gravitational pull” on
state decisions.85 One reason for this overwhelming magnetic force
is that federal law “has a degree of visibility and persuasiveness that
state law lacks.”86
There are, however, other areas of the law in which states and
state courts have diverged from Supreme Court jurisprudence. For
example, prior to the series of Supreme Court cases legalizing samesex marriage, a number of states diverged from the long-standing
federal restrictions on gay rights.87 Additionally, the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule differs from federal law among some
states. 88 These exceptions provide a caveat throughout this Article:
the gravitational force does not influence every state in all areas of
state law. Nonetheless, the depth of state conformity to congressional acts and Supreme Court doctrine is noteworthy and deserves

the laws of forty-one states provided greater protection than federal law in at least
one area, while four states provided greater protection in nine areas).
83
Cauthen, supra note 82, at 1194–96.
84
Solimine, supra note 22, at 338 (emphasis in original).
85
See ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS
185 (2009).
86
See Dodson, supra note 1, at 739 n.197 (quoting Goldfarb, supra note 61,
at 92).
87
Dodson, supra note 1, at 741–42; see, e.g., Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44,
68 (Haw. 1993) (finding gay marriage restrictions presumptively unconstitutional
under the Hawaii constitution); Goodridge v. Mass. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798
N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003) (finding limitations of civil marriage to individuals
of opposite sexes lacked rational basis and violated state constitutional equal protection principles); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 889 (Vt. 1999) (finding exclusion of same-sex couples from benefits and protections incident to marriage under
state law violated common benefits clause of State Constitution).
88
See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651–52 (1961); Dodson, supra note 1, at
744 n.237.
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greater exploration in other areas of constitutional law, such as takings law.89
One might assume that given the structural and governmental
differences between the federal Constitution and the state constitutions, as well as the sensitive policy matters reviewed by state supreme courts, “states should exercise independence in state constitutionalism.”90 But the gravitational force to which Dodson, Long,
Goldfarb, Williams, and Solimine speak still results in a judicial culture of “go with the flow unless some countervailing force enables
resistance.”91 This has produced a phenomenon where state constitutions are being interpreted to mimic Supreme Court interpretations
of the federal Constitution, leading to the adoption and application
of the Court’s interpretive methodologies.92 The concern, of course,
is that such blind following might have the effect of confusing interpretations of the analogous state constitutional provision.93
Indeed, independent state constitutionalism, for which Justice
William Brennan once advocated, 94 arguably failed to materialize.
The tendency is for state constitutions and state constitutional law
to converge with the language and body of the federal Constitution
and Supreme Court jurisprudence.95 This is partially a result of the
“often unstated premise that U.S. Supreme [C]ourt interpretations of
the federal Bill of Rights are presumptively correct for interpreting
analogous state provisions.”96 Even if the state constitutional provision is different from the federal one, states tend to apply the Supreme Court’s doctrinal scripts,97 largely because state bills of rights
89

See infra Part II for a discussion of state conformity to federal takings doc-

trine.
90

See Dodson, supra note 1, at 725.
Id. at 727; see WILLIAMS, supra note 85; Goldfarb, supra note 61; Long,
supra note 6; Solimine, supra note 22.
92
Solimine, supra note 22, at 338.
93
WILLIAMS, supra note 85, at 151–52 .
94
See Brennan, State Constitutions, supra note 58, at 420–21.
95
Gardner, Failed Discourse, supra note 80, at 764–66; see also Lawrence
Friedman, Path Dependence and the External Constraints on Independent State
Constitutionalism, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 783, 783–84 (2011).
96
WILLIAMS, supra note 85, at 135 (arguing that this premise is wrong); see
also Dodson, supra note 1, at 724–26 (arguing that states should exercise independence in interpreting their constitutional provisions).
97
GARDNER, supra note 4, at 6–7; Gardner, Failed Discourse, supra note 80,
at 791–92.
91
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reproduce in some form or another the full list of rights protected
under the federal version.98 This, of course, has led state courts to
adopt the tests and doctrines of the Supreme Court as their own.99
The influence of the gravitational force of federal law on state actors
is well recognized in the literature, but scholars have paid little attention to this phenomenon in the context of constitutional property.
II. CONVERGENCE AND (RARE) DIVERGENCE IN CONSTITUTIONAL
PROPERTY
This Part offers empirical evidence regarding whether states experience a similar gravitational pull—a centripetal force—that lures
the drafting of state legislation and establishment of state court doctrine towards the United States Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence.100 Indeed, the empirical evidence bears out the reality that
state legislatures have enacted statutes that conform to the Court’s
doctrine and state courts have applied the Court’s doctrinal tests.
However, the one major exception to this conformity is the postKelo centrifugal episode that has created today’s rupture between
continued state convergence in the Court’s regulatory takings vein
and state divergence in Court’s public use vein.
A.
Convergence in Takings Doctrine
The federal regulatory takings and public use doctrine have
greatly influenced state actors. But what is the extent of this conformity amongst state courts and their state constitutions?
1. STATE COURTS AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS
Scholars tracking the extent to which states have followed federal law have said little, if anything, about this relationship as applied to takings.101 Unlike the constitutional facets of, for example,
98

Joseph Blocher, Reverse Incorporation of State Constitutional Law, 84 S.
CAL. L. REV. 323, 332–33 (2011).
99
Id. at 334.
100
See also Merrill, supra note 11, at 67 n.24 (discussing survey evidence
“that most challenges to state condemnations are based on state constitutional provisions rather than on the fourteenth amendment”).
101
See Dodson, supra note 1, at 707–29 (examining the state law trend in
tracking analogous federal laws to decide issues of state law in areas like rules of
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the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause, the Takings
Clause “furnishes no comparable constitutional baseline.”102 The
difference? The Takings Clause “protects primarily against change
in background state law.”103 Thus, landowners’ protections from
physical or regulatory takings are determined by background principles of state legislation and common law.104 While Supreme Court
doctrine establishes “a floor below which state courts cannot go to
protect individual rights,” states have wide latitude to afford greater
protections under state constitutions.105 Of course, states can provide
protections above the federal minima where appropriate.
But more to the point, as a baseline, the federal Takings Clause
is widely represented within state constitutions.106 An overwhelming majority of states have a takings clause that parallels the federal
Constitution’s, although some states offer additional protections by
adding a “damages” clause.107 Moreover, in the majority of states,
regulatory takings claims are treated identically under both constitutional texts.108 On the whole, it thus seems that judicial pronouncements from many different states have simply copied the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the Takings Clause.109 For example, the Arizona Constitution provides protection “like” that provided for by

evidence and employment discrimination). But see Sterk, supra note 21, at 215–
18 (examining how state law provides the starting point of a regulatory Takings
Clause analysis); Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution,
117 YALE L.J. 408, 423–24 (2007) (“[T]he Federal Constitution says [property
rights] cannot be ‘taken’ without just compensation, but they are generally created
in the first instance by state law.”).
102
Sterk, supra note 21, at 206.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
See State v. Sieyes, 225 P.3d 995, 1003 (Wash. 2010) (en banc).
106
JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 1061 n.2 (7th ed. 2010)
(noting that nearly all state constitutions contain a takings clause worded similarly
to the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause).
107
See Maureen E. Brady, Property’s Ceiling: State Courts and the Expansion
of Takings Clause Property, 102 VA. L. REV. 1167, 1175 n.19 (2016) (listing state
constitutions that added expansions to state takings provisions, including damage
considerations).
108
Phillips v. Montgomery County, 442 S.W.3d 233, 240 (Tenn. 2014); see
infra note 136.
109
See Sterk, supra note 21, at 205.

2018]

FEDERALISM, CONVERGENCE, AND DIVERGENCE

157

the federal provision.110 The Maryland Constitution has the “same
meaning and effect” as the federal Takings Clause.111 And Vermont’s takings clause demands “virtually the same test.”112 Thus,
state courts have developed, like other provisions of the Bill of
Rights, some form of a “takings” jurisprudence.113 To be clear, state
courts recognizing or identifying substantially similar language between the state and federal constitutional takings provisions is nothing extraordinary. It seems that the vast majority of state courts are,
indeed, adopting federal takings jurisprudence.114 While adoption of
the doctrinal rubric is well-known, the actual application of the doctrine at the state level still raises questions.
As Stewart Sterk notes, state takings regulations are simultaneously measured by both federal doctrine and background state
law.115 That can make for some murky applications of the takings
doctrine at the state level, and may be the reason why a national
takings standard is unlikely.116 Because takings doctrine is a muddle
of confusing tests and complex categorical rules, the manner for
which state courts follow the Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence
is curious.117
The Court’s decision in Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council is indicative of the complexity of regulatory takings. There, the Court established the longstanding test that a regulation will only be considered
a “taking” if it denies the landowner of “all economically beneficial
use” of the property.118 Thus, if the regulation leaves owners with
110

Wonders v. Pima County, 89 P.3d 810, 814 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004) (finding
Arizona Constitution provided “like” protection to the federal Takings Clause and
state’s application of Lucas test “consistent” with constitutional requirements).
111
Neifert v. Dep’t of the Env’t, 910 A.2d 1100, 1118 n.33 (Md. 2006).
112
Ondovchik Family Ltd. P’ship v. Agency of Transp., 996 A.2d 1179, 1184
(Vt. 2010) (quoting Conway v. Sorrell, 894 F. Supp. 794, 801 n.8 (D. Vt. 1995)).
113
See Robert Force, State “Bills of Rights”: A Case of Neglect and the Need
for a Renaissance, 3 VAL. U. L. REV. 125, 145–42 (1969) (comparing state bills
of rights provisions to guarantee in the federal Bill of Rights and finding substantial similarities).
114
Phillips v. Montgomery County, 442 S.W.3d 233, 244 (Tenn. 2014).
115
See Sterk, supra note 21, at 203–26.
116
Id. at 226–37.
117
Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue is Still a
Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561, 562–63 (1984).
118
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992).
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some viable use of the land, it would likely still be deemed constitutional.119 Another example of the complexity of regulatory takings
is the Court’s ruling in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., which rejected
a blend of the due process substantial advances test into the regulatory takings analysis.120 This decision, too, has been widely adopted
by state courts.121 Furthermore, with the Court’s Penn Central test,
which provides protections where less than all economic benefit is
lost,122 state courts “almost always defer to the regulatory decisions
made by government officials, resulting in an almost categorical rule
that Penn Central-type regulatory actions do not amount to takings.”123
State courts seem to employ the federal analytical frameworks
in examining state constitutional takings claims and rarely offer
greater protections. In California, for example, one court noted that
“even if we did intend to interpret the state right more narrowly than
the federal right,” the federal Takings Clause would still apply to
protect the property owner.124 In Iowa, courts note that because of

119

See Krier & Sterk, supra note 8, at 63.
544 U.S. 528, 548 (2005).
121
See, e.g., Lockaway Storage v. County of Alameda, 156 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607,
623 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013); Wensmann Realty, Inc. v. City of Eagan, 734 N.W.2d
623, 639 (Minn. 2007); Dunes W. Golf Club, LLC v. Town of Mount Pleasant,
737 S.E.2d 601, 611 (S.C. 2013).
122
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 136 (1978).
123
Krier & Sterk, supra note 8, at 62. Some scholars argue that there tends to
be little variation and divergence in interpretations of the Supreme Court’s exaction tests described in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825
(1987) and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) by state and lower federal
courts. See Brett Christopher Gerry, Parity Revisited: An Empirical Comparison
of State and Lower Federal Court Interpretations of Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 233, 259–69 (1999) (discussing Takings Clause cases). Other studies found that state courts cite Nollan and Dolan
relatively frequently (two-thirds of the time) and state courts appear “to be aware
of [the Nollan and Dolan] mandates.” Krier & Sterk, supra note 8, at 68. But,
another empirical study has found that “few state court decisions even mentioned
[Nollan and Dolan] in reaching decisions subject to them.” Id. at 68 n.129; see
also Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Non-Impact of the United States Supreme Court
Regulatory Takings Cases on the State Courts: Does the Supreme Court Really
Matter?, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 523, 537–56 (1995) (analyzing state court decisions interpreting the Supreme Court’s regulatory takings cases).
124
Kavanau v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 941 P.2d 851, 860 (Cal. 1997).
120
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the similarities of the two provisions, “we consider federal cases interpreting the federal provision persuasive in our interpretation of
the state provision.”125 Maryland courts follow suit, noting that the
Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence is “practically [a] direct authorit[y]” for analyzing takings challenges in both state and federal
claims.126 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court expressly declined to adopt more expansive protections beyond the federal baseline.127 Minnesota has usually followed the standards set forth in
Penn Central as the “best analytic framework” to evaluate regulatory takings under the state constitution.128 In Maine, the Supreme
Judicial Court has preferred to analyze state and federal takings
claims together.129 Arizona, for example, tends to equate its state
takings clause with the federal.130 Some, like California, are reluctant, even though they could, to depart from the federal doctrinal
script.131 Others are more general in their approach to comparing
both documents.132
125

Kingsway Cathedral v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 711 N.W.2d 6, 9 (Iowa

2006).
126

Neifert v. Dep’t of the Env’t, 910 A.2d 1100, 1118 n.33 (Md. 2006) (quoting Green Party v. Bd. of Electors, 832 A.2d 214, 237 (Md. 2003)).
127
Blair v. Dep’t of Conservation & Recreation, 932 N.E.2d 267, 274 (Mass.
2010).
128
Wensmann Realty, Inc. v. City of Eagan, 734 N.W.2d 623, 633 (Minn.
2007).
129
See, e.g., MC Assocs. v. Town of Cape Elizabeth, 773 A.2d 439, 443 (Me.
2001).
130
See Mutschler v. City of Phoenix, 129 P.3d 71, 72 n.1 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006)
(noting that the Arizona takings clause “provides that ‘[n]o private property shall
be taken or damaged for public or private use without just compensation having
first been made’” and that “[f]or purposes of this case, the analysis of appellants’
Takings Clause claim is the same under both the Federal and Arizona Constitutions” (alteration in original) (quoting ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 17)); Wonders v.
Pima County, 89 P.3d 810, 814–16 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004) (finding Arizona constitution provided “like” protection to the federal Takings Clause and state’s application of Lucas test “consistent” with constitutional requirements).
131
Kavanau v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 941 P.2d 851, 860 (Cal. 1997)
(stating that “[e]ven if we did intend to interpret the state right more narrowly than
the federal right, the federal Constitution would nevertheless apply here to protect” the plaintiff landowner).
132
Leone v. County of Maui, 284 P.3d 956, 962–63 (Haw. Ct. App. 2012)
(reviewing inverse condemnation claim under Hawaii and federal Takings
Clause); Boise Tower Assocs., LLC v. Hogland, 215 P.3d 494, 503 (Idaho 2009)
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Some states, like Iowa, are explicit in the level of protections
afforded under the state and federal clauses, often times finding the
state does not go further.133 Some prefer to rely upon both federal
(evaluating state takings claim exclusively under federal takings doctrine); N. Ill.
Home Builder Ass’n v. County of Du Page, 649 N.E.2d 384, 388 (Ill. 1995) (examining plaintiffs’ takings claim under both the state and federal takings clauses);
Kan. One-Call Sys., Inc. v. State, 274 P.3d 625, 638 (Kan. 2012) (relying on Supreme Court distinction of two types of regulations that are considered per se takings); Baston v. Cty. of Kenton ex rel. Kenton Cty. Airport Bd., 319 S.W.3d 401,
406 (Ky. 2010) (explaining that both the Kentucky Constitution and the U.S. Constitution require just compensation for a taking); Annison v. Hoover, 517 So. 2d
420, 423 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (assessing a takings claim under both the Louisiana
Constitution and U.S. Constitution); Neifert v. Dep’t of the Env’t, 910 A.2d 1100,
1118 n.33 (Md. 2006) (stating that the Supreme Court takings cases are “practically direct authorities” for the federal and Maryland takings clauses, and that the
takings clauses of the federal and Maryland Constitutions “have the same meaning and effect” (internal citations omitted)); Tolksdorf v. Griffith, 626 N.W.2d
163, 165 (Mich. 2001) (stating that “[t]he Taking Clause of the state constitution
is substantially similar to that of the federal constitution”); Adams Outdoor Advert. v. City of East Lansing, 614 N.W.2d 634, 638 (Mich. 2000) (drawing on
Supreme Court’s regulatory takings jurisprudence and similarities between federal and state takings clause); K & K Constr., Inc. v. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 575
N.W.2d 531, 534–35 (Mich. 1998); Kafka v. Mont. Dep’t of Fish, Wildlife &
Parks, 201 P.3d 8, 18 (Mont. 2008); Scofield v. State Dep’t of Nat. Res., 753
N.W.2d 345, 358–59 (Neb. 2008); MC Assocs., 773 A.2d at 443 (preferring to
analyze state and federal takings claims together); Seawall Assocs. v. City of New
York, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 1062–70 (N.Y. 1989) (finding local regulations effect
takings under New York and federal constitutions); Manufactured Hous. Cmtys.
of Wash. v. State, 13 P.3d 183, 187–88 (Wash. 2000) (noting that under existing
Washington and federal law, a police power measure can violate the state and
federal constitutions and thus be subject to a categorical “facial” taking challenge).
133
Harms v. City of Sibley, 702 N.W.2d 91, 97 (Iowa 2005) (noting that
“[b]ecause the Harms have not asserted and ‘we have not found a basis to distinguish the protection afforded by the Iowa Constitution from those afforded by the
Federal Constitution under the facts of this case, our [takings] analysis applies
equally to both the state and federal grounds’” (quoting State v. Carter, 696
N.W.2d 31, 37 (Iowa 2005))); Blair v. Dep’t of Conservation & Recreation, 932
N.E.2d 267, 274 (Mass. 2010) (declining to adopt more expansive protections beyond what the federal takings clause affords and instead following its “long-standing precedent” to interpret state Takings Clause to provide property owners the
same protections as under federal law); McCarran Int’l Airport v. Sisolak, 137
P.3d 1110, 1121 (Nev. 2006) (following federal takings precedent, but arguing
that state takings clause has expansive protections); Mansoldo v. State, 898 A.2d
1018, 1023–24 (N.J. 2006) (stating that “protection from governmental takings
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and state clauses to make a determination, but rarely go beyond the
federal even if the state clause provides such flexibility.134 Others
will explicitly follow the Lucas, Palazzolo,135 and Penn Central
tests without much explanation for why.136 Even in the exactions
under the New Jersey Constitution is coextensive with protection under the Federal Constitution”); Moongate Water Co. v. City of Las Cruces, 302 P.3d 405, 410
(N.M. 2013) (explaining that in evaluating takings claims under the New Mexico
Constitution, the court turns to both the federal and state takings cases for guidance, since the state takings clause provides “similar” protection to the federal).
134
Animas Valley Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 38 P.3d 59,
63–65 (Colo. 2001) (relying on both Colorado and federal case law for guidance,
and concluding that by “[r]eading [Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606
(2001),] together with the Court’s prior precedent, it is apparent that the level of
interference must be very high,” drawing its conclusions from several Supreme
Court sources); A. Gallo & Co. v. Comm’r of Envtl. Prot., 73 A.3d 693, 701
(Conn. 2013) (assessing both the federal and state constitutions’ Takings
Clauses); Wild Rice River Estates, Inc. v. City of Fargo, 705 N.W.2d 850, 856
(N.D. 2005) (noting that state supreme court “looked to both state and federal
precedents in construing takings claims under the state constitution,” but that the
state takings clause is “broader in some respects” than the federal Takings
Clause); Ondovchik Family Ltd. P’ship v. Agency of Transp., 996 A.2d 1179,
1184 (Vt. 2010) (determining that since the Federal and Vermont Constitutions
“use virtually the same test for takings review,” the “analysis and result in this
case are the same” under both provisions (quoting Conway v. Sorrell, 894 F. Supp.
794, 801 n.8 (D. Vt. 1995))).
135
See infra notes 297–98 and accompanying text for more information on
Palazzolo.
136
Forest Glade Mgmt., L.L.C. v. City of Hot Springs, No. CA 08-200, 2008
WL 4876230, at *2–3 (Ark. Ct. App. Nov. 12, 2008) (following the reasoning of
Lucas to adjudicate a takings claim); Salem Church (Del.) Assocs. v. New Castle
County, No. 20305-NC, 2006 WL 4782453, at *16 (Del. Ch. Oct. 6, 2006) (relying on and applying Penn Central test in evaluating state takings claim); Embassy
Real Estate Holdings, L.L.C. v. D.C. Mayor’s Agent for Historic Pres., 944 A.2d
1036, 1052–55 (D.C. 2008) (applying Penn Central test to state takings claim);
Greater Atlanta Homebuilders Ass’n v. DeKalb County, 588 S.E.2d 694, 697–98
(Ga. 2003) (dismissing appellants’ takings claim on grounds that Penn Central
test was not satisfied); Pub. Access Shoreline Haw. v. Haw. Cty. Planning
Comm’n, 903 P.2d 1246, 1272–73 (Haw. 1995) (analyzing and deciding takings
claim under Lucas test); Frick v. City of Salina, 235 P.3d 1211, 1223 (Kan. 2010)
(noting that “to determine whether the moratorium imposed in this case was a
taking, we must apply the Penn Central standards”); DeCook v. Rochester Int’l
Airport Joint Zoning Bd., 796 N.W.2d 299, 305 (Minn. 2011) (noting that the
court has “often applied Penn Central to decide a regulatory takings case under
the Minnesota Constitution”); Wensmann Realty, 734 N.W.2d at 631–33 (noting
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context, some state courts have also resorted to the federal baseline
and “appeared to be aware of” the Court’s exactions mandates.137

that the court had “relied on cases interpreting” the federal Takings Clause in interpreting the Minnesota Takings Clause, and agreeing that “the standards set
forth in Penn Central provide the best analytic framework to determine whether
the city’s actions resulted in a regulatory taking under the Minnesota Constitution”); Machipongo Land & Coal Co. v. Commonwealth, 799 A.2d 751, 762 (Pa.
2002) (applying Supreme Court’s Palazzolo reasoning to takings claim, stating
“[a] similar result should follow in this case”); Bd. of Supervisors v. Greengael,
L.L.C., 626 S.E.2d 357, 369 (Va. 2006) (evaluating state takings claims under
Supreme Court’s Penn Central loss of less than all economic value test); McFillan
v. Berkeley Cty. Planning Comm’n, 438 S.E.2d 801, 809 (W. Va. 1993) (analyzing takings claim under state and federal takings clause applying Lucas test); R.W.
Docks & Slips v. State, 628 N.W. 2d 781, 786 (Wis. 2001) (noting that Wisconsin
courts follow and apply a version of the Lucas test); Eberle v. Dane Cty. Bd. of
Adjustment, 595 N.W.2d 730, 737 (Wis. 1999) (noting that Wisconsin applies the
same regulatory takings rules as the federal courts, such as the Lucas test, which
state that regulations that deny a landowner of all or substantially all of the land’s
practical use constitute a taking); Cheyenne Airport Bd. v. Rogers, 707 P.2d 717,
728–32 (Wyo. 1985).
137
Krier & Sterk, supra note 8, at 68; see Clay Cty. ex rel. Cty. Comm’n v.
Harley & Susie Bogue, Inc., 988 S.W.2d 102, 107 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (considering the same factors as the Supreme Court in evaluating a takings claim under
the Missouri Takings Clause and adopting the Supreme Court’s Nollan test).
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Some courts will peer into the plain text of both documents to determine differences.138 South Carolina once revised its position on takings by conforming to the Supreme Court reasoning.139 Few have
expressly elected the state approach over the federal approach.140
Other state courts acknowledge that the legislature may confer
greater protections than those offered by takings clauses, but rarely
have those courts extended further protections.141 And, of course,
state supreme courts are choosing to follow, rather than lead, based
on the precedent set by lower state appellate courts which also slavishly follow the Supreme Court’s doctrine.142
138
State v. Kimco of Evansville, Inc., 902 N.E.2d 206, 210 (Ind. 2009) (noting
that “the state and federal takings clauses are textually indistinguishable and are
to be analyzed identically”); Kingsway Cathedral v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 711
N.W.2d 6, 9 (Iowa 2006) (stating that “[b]ecause of [the state and federal] similarity regarding takings, we consider federal cases interpreting the federal provision persuasive in our interpretation of the state provision”); Walters v. City of
Greenville, 751 So. 2d 1206, 1210 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999) (stating that “Mississippi
case law gives no distinct definition of a ‘taking’ of property; therefore, we turn
to federal case law which has given such definition”); Hallco Tex., Inc. v. McMullen County, 221 S.W.3d 50, 56 (Tex. 2006) (explaining that “[a]lthough our takings provision is worded differently than the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, we have described it as ‘comparable’ and
the parties here agree that it is appropriate to look to federal cases for guidance”);
Sheffield Dev. Co. v. City of Glenn Heights, 140 S.W.3d 660, 669 (Tex. 2004)
(analyzing takings claim by applying Texas Takings Clause to “federal jurisprudence for guidance,” even though “it could be argued that the differences in the
wording of the two provisions are significant”).
139
Byrd v. City of Hartsville, 620 S.E.2d 76, 79 n.6 (S.C. 2005) (revising state
takings doctrine to conform and comply with Supreme Court reasoning and noting
that “[t]akings analysis under South Carolina law is the same as the analysis under
federal law” (citing Westside Quik Shop v. Stewart, 534 S.E.2d 270, 275 (S.C.
2000))).
140
State ex rel. R.T.G., Inc. v. State, 780 N.E.2d 998, 1008 (Ohio 2002) (declining to invoke Lucas’ dicta on how to define the relevant parcel for the takings
analysis, instead “determining the relevant parcel in a takings analysis pursuant
to the Takings Clause of the Ohio Constitution”).
141
See Kimco, 902 N.E.2d at 212 (“Constitutional doctrine is not the end of
the matter. Legislatures may confer greater rights to compensation for government
action than those afforded by the constitutional takings clauses.”).
142
Wonders v. Pima County, 89 P.3d 810, 814 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004) (finding
Arizona’s constitution provided “like” protection to the federal Takings Clause
and the state’s application of the Lucas test “consistent” with constitutional requirements); Forest Glade Mgmt., L.L.C. v. City of Hot Springs, No. CA 08-200,
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In short, not only do state supreme courts mimic federal regulatory takings doctrine, they usually decline to apply the doctrine in a
way that would offer more protections for landowners and rarely go
beyond or modify the Supreme Court’s doctrinal baseline.143 Indeed,
the narrative in constitutional property seems to fit the gravitational
narrative in other areas of constitutional law that are subject to a
constitutional bottom.144 However, there are a few examples of divergence, and we should be cautious not to claim wholesale conformity across the board.145

2008 WL 4876230, at *2–3 (Ark. Ct. App. Nov. 12, 2008) (following the reasoning of Lucas to adjudicate a takings claim); Salem Church (Del.) Assocs. v. New
Castle County, No. 20305-NC, 2006 WL 4782453, at *16 (Del. Ch. Oct. 6, 2006)
(relying on and applying Penn Central test in evaluating state takings claim); Walters, 751 So. 2d at 1210 (stating that “Mississippi case law gives no distinct definition of a ‘taking’ of property; therefore, we turn to federal case law which has
given such definition”); Annison v. Hoover, 517 So. 2d 420, 423 (La. Ct. App.
1987) (assessing a takings claim under both the Louisiana Constitution and U.S.
Constitution); See Mutschler v. City of Phoenix, 129 P.3d 71, 72 n.1 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2006) (noting that the Arizona takings clause “provides that ‘[n]o private
property shall be taken or damaged for public or private use without just compensation having first been made’” and that “[f]or purposes of this case, the analysis
of appellants’ Takings Clause claim is the same under both the Federal and Arizona Constitutions” (alteration in original) (quoting ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 17));
see also Twain Harte Assocs. v. County of Tuolumne, 265 Cal. Rptr. 737, 749
(1990); G & A Land, LLC v. City of Brighton, 233 P.3d 701, 706 (Colo. App.
2010); Clay County, 988 S.W.2d at 107; Beroth Oil Co. v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp.,
725 S.E.2d 651, 661 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012).
143
See infra Section III.A. The recent decision by the Tennessee Supreme
Court in Phillips v. Montgomery County, discussed at length in Section III.A,
seems to suggest, from the vantage point of a state supreme court, that sister state
courts have been pulled by the gravitational force of the federal regulatory takings
analytical framework, but also notes the few exceptions where states provided
greater protections or developed their own tests. 442 S.W. 3d 233, 240 n.10 (Tenn.
2014).
144
However, some state courts have said otherwise, noting that “there is no
reason why [the state constitution] cannot be interpreted to provide fewer protections than the Federal Constitution,” even though “[o]f course, . . . [where] the
Federal Constitution is more expansive, it must override contrary state law.”
Sanders v. State, 585 A.2d 117, 146 n.25 (Del. 1990); see Davis v. Brown, 851
N.E.2d 1198, 1204 (Ill. 2006) (applying general principles of whether regulation
“goes too far” under Supreme Court’s Penn Central test).
145
R & Y, Inc. v. Municipality of Anchorage, 34 P.3d 289, 293 n.11 (Alaska
2001) (stating that “[t]he inclusion of the term ‘damage’ affords the property
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owner broader protection than that conferred by the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution” (quoting Ehrlander v. State Dep’t of Transp. & Pub. Facilities,
797 P.2d 629, 633 (Alaska 1990))); San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & County of
San Francisco, 41 P.3d 87, 100–02 (Cal. 2002); Herzberg v. County of Plumas,
34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588, 595 (Cal Ct. App. 2005) (“The California Constitution also
requires just compensation when private property is ‘damaged for public use.’ ‘By
virtue of including “damage[]” to property as well as its “tak[ing],” the California
clause “protects a somewhat broader range of property values” than does the corresponding federal provision.’ Apart from that difference, however, the California
Supreme Court has construed the state clause congruently with the federal clause”
(alterations in original) (citations omitted)); DeCook v. Rochester Int’l Airport
Joint Zoning Bd., 796 N.W.2d 299, 305–06 (Minn. 2011) (holding that an airport
zoning ordinance which diminished the value of nearby property located in a runway safety zone by as much as six percent (6%) was a compensable regulatory
taking under the Minnesota Constitution, which requires compensation where private property is “taken, destroyed or damaged for public use” because the regulation benefited a specific governmental purpose and caused the owners to suffer a
“substantial and measurable decline” in the market value of their property; while
Minnesota courts had previously followed the Supreme Court’s Penn Central decision, which interpreted the less broadly-phrased federal takings clause, the court
noted that Penn Central was “not the only test” and declined to apply it where a
regulatory action would be considered a taking under the Minnesota takings
clause because of damage to property value caused by a regulation); Interstate
Cos. v. City of Bloomington, 790 N.W.2d 409, 413–14 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010)
(explaining that the Minnesota state constitution provides more protection because it requires compensation when property is “damaged” or “destroyed,” as
well as “taken,” and thus “where land use regulations, such as the airport zoning
ordinance here, are designed to benefit a specific public or governmental enterprise, there must be compensation to landowners whose property has suffered a
substantial and measurable decline in market value as a result of the regulations”
(quoting McShane v. City of Faribault, 292 N.W.2d 253, 258–59 (Minn. 1980));
Wild Rice River Estates, Inc. v. City of Fargo, 705 N.W.2d 850, 856 (N.D. 2005)
(explaining that “[under North Dakota Constitution article I, section 16], ‘[p]rivate property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation.’ This Court has said our state constitutional provision is broader in some
respects than its federal counterpart because the state provision ‘was intended to
secure to owners, not only the possession of property, but also those rights which
render possession valuable’” (alteration in original) (quoting Grand Forks-Traill
Water Users, Inc. v. Hjelle, 413 N.W.2d 344, 346 (N.D. 1987))); Estate & Heirs
of Sanchez v. County of Bernalillo, 902 P.2d 550, 553 (N.M. 1995) (noting that
New Mexico, unlike the United States, requires compensation when property is
damaged, but not taken, but in order to require compensation, the damage must
affect some property right that is not generally shared or enjoyed by the public);
Krier v. Dell Rapids Township, 709 N.W.2d 841, 846 (S.D. 2006) (“Article VI,
section 13 of our Constitution differs from the Fifth Amendment of the Federal
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A few state courts have taken steps to interpret their takings
clauses to offer greater protection to property owners in regulatory
takings challenges than would be required by the federal takings
doctrine.146 A handful of states have developed their own takings
tests that offer stronger protections, or declined the Court’s doctrine
altogether.147 For example, the Washington Supreme Court has
stated that its state constitution has a history of extending greater
protections from governmental interference with private property; it
declined to follow the Supreme Court’s regulatory takings doctrine,
instead choosing to follow a state-formulated regulatory takings
test.148 The Nevada Supreme Court has suggested that its takings
clause “contemplates expansive property rights” beyond the federal
Takings Clause, and that a regulatory takings analysis under the
Constitution in two key respects. First . . . we impose ‘public use’ requirements
that are more strict than the federal baseline. Second, our Constitution requires
that the government compensate a property owner not only when a taking has
occurred, but also when private property has been ‘damaged.’ The Federal Constitution does not contain a ‘damage’ clause.” (internal citations omitted)).
146
See, e.g., R & Y, Inc., 34 P.3d at 293 (acknowledging that the Alaska Constitution provides property owners broader protection than the United States Constitution); Avenal v. State, 886 So. 2d 1085, 1104 (La. 2004) (noting that the Louisiana Constitution requires compensation for property “damaged” as well as
“taken”); Gilich v. Miss. State Highway Comm’n, 574 So. 2d 8, 11–12 (Miss.
1990) (holding that the Mississippi Constitution provides broader protection than
the United States Constitution for property “taken or damaged” (emphasis omitted)); Krier, 709 N.W.2d at 846 (recognizing that the South Dakota Constitution
imposes stricter requirements than the United States Constitution, such as compensation when property is “taken” or “damaged”).
147
See, e.g., Town of Gurley v. M & N Materials, Inc., 143 So. 3d 1, 12, 49–
50 (Ala. 2012) (declining to recognize regulatory takings under the state constitution and rejecting federal precedents); Coast Range Conifers, LLC v. State ex rel.
State Bd. of Forestry, 117 P.3d 990, 996 (Or. 2005) (en banc) (noting that a regulatory taking occurs under the Oregon Constitution only when there is no economically viable use of the property); Utah Dep’t of Transp. v. Admiral Beverage
Corp., 275 P.3d 208, 215 (Utah 2011) (explaining that Utah’s just compensation
clause is triggered when there is “any substantial interference with private property which destroys or materially lessens its value, or by which the owner’s right
to its use and enjoyment is in any substantial degree abridged or destroyed” (quoting Stockdale v. Rio Grande W. Ry. Co., 77 P. 849, 852 (Utah 1904))); Manufactured Hous. Cmtys. of Wash. v. State, 13 P.3d 183, 187–88 (Wash. 2000);
Guimont v. Clarke, 854 P.2d 1, 5–11 (Wash. 1993) (en banc) (developing a series
of tests to determine if a compensable taking has occurred, drawing upon both
state and federal precedents).
148
Manufactured Hous. Cmtys., 13 P.3d at 189, 196–97.
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state constitution, unlike federal doctrine, occurs when the state fails
to “follow . . . procedures” under state law and “appropriates or permanently invades private property.”149 North Dakota has found that
the state takings provision is broader “in some respects” than the
federal provision “because the state provision ‘was intended to secure to owners, not only the possession of property, but also those
rights which render possession valuable.’”150 Most extreme is the
Alabama Supreme Court, which has declined to recognize regulatory takings under state constitutional law and rejects federal precedents.151 There, the Alabama Supreme Court looked to the plain language of the Alabama constitution’s takings clause, finding that the
clause “does not make compensable regulatory ‘takings’” and that
the language of the federal and state clauses were not similar enough
to give rise to a regulatory takings claim under state constitutional
law.152 And what about state actors’ approaches to the federal public
use doctrine? It is mostly the same—mimicry.
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Berman spurred the broader,
modern-day takings conception.153 Justice Douglas stated that
“[s]ubject to specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature
has spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh
conclusive.”154 The Court held that takings for the underlying purpose of clearing slums and blighted neighborhoods was a valid public use under the Takings Clause.155 Berman not only opened the
149

McCarran Int’l Airport v. Sisolak, 137 P.3d 1110, 1127 (Nev. 2006). A
persuasive dissent begs to differ based on records of the drafters of the constitution. Id. at 1131 n.8 (Becker, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
150
Wild Rice, 705 N.W.2d at 856 (noting, however, that “our cases on inverse
condemnation under the state constitution bear some similarities to the federal
analysis.”).
151
Town of Gurley, 143 So. 3d at 12, 49–50 (declining to recognize regulatory
takings under the state constitution and rejecting federal precedents)
152
Id. at 13.
153
Romeo v. Cranston Redevelopment Agency, 254 A.2d 426, 432 (R.I. 1969)
(“Perhaps the single greatest contribution to the expanded view of a public use
came in 1954 with the holding of the United States Supreme Court in the case of
[Berman].”).
154
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
155
Id. at 35–36. In Berman, the Court was faced with a redevelopment project
that sought to ameliorate a blighted area in Washington D.C. Id. at 28. The housing was decrepit and uninhabitable. Id. Thus, the City condemned the land and
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door for urban renewal projects to flourish, but also introduced economic development as a tempting justification for eminent domain.156 Decades later, the Supreme Court stuck closely, once again,
to its broad conception of eminent domain in Midkiff, ruling that a
Hawaii statute that allowed fee title to be taken from landlords and
transferred to tenants in an effort to reduce the concentration of land
ownership was a valid public use.157 The majority of state courts
seem to have gravitated to the Court’s broader conception of “public
use.”158 Even though the Berman decision implied federal takings,
the ruling has had a formidable influence over state courts.159 Many
scholars have argued that as a result of Berman, both state and federal courts have given legislatures and administrative agencies far
too much discretion in eminent domain determinations justified only
by the Supreme Court saying so.160 Indeed, following Berman
transferred title to private entities for the public purpose of redevelopment, which
also included construction of low-cost housing. Id. at 28–32. In upholding this
purpose, the Court was unpersuaded that nonblighted property within a blighted
neighborhood meant that the creation of a better balanced and more attractive
community was not a justifiable public use to exercise condemnation. Id. at 35.
156
See, e.g., People ex rel. City of Urbana v. Paley, 368 N.E.2d 915, 921 (Ill.
1977); Green v. City of Mt. Pleasant, 131 N.W.2d 5, 17 (Iowa 1964); Common
Cause v. State, 455 A.2d 1, 25 (Me. 1983); City of Pipestone v. Madsen, 178
N.W.2d 594, 600–01, 604 (Minn. 1970); Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, 467
S.E.2d 615, 627 (N.C. 1996).
157
Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 233–34, 245 (1984).
158
See BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 47–48 (1998); HOWARD GILLMAN,
THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE
POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 228 n.104 (1993); Wendell E. Pritchett, The “Public
Menace” of Blight: Urban Renewal and the Private Uses of Eminent Domain, 21
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 9 (2003). Pritchett notes that state courts were ambivalent about the broad conception of public use through many nineteenth century
eminent domain battles leading up to the Berman ruling. Id. While the Supreme
Court’s early acceptance of economic development as a justifiable public use
blossomed, many state courts continued to apply a narrow and limited version of
the doctrine. Id. at 13. It is also worth noting that in 1923, the Supreme Court
exercised a limited role in reviewing public use cases and that state determinations
regarding public use would be viewed with “great respect” by the Court. Id. at 12
(discussing Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700, 705–06 (1923)).
159
See Laura Mansnerus, Note, Public Use, Private Use, and Judicial Review
in Eminent Domain, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 409, 426 (1983).
160
Pritchett, supra note 158, at 4–5 (citing Stephen J. Jones, Trumping Eminent Domain Law: An Argument for Strict Scrutiny Analysis Under the Public
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thirty-four state supreme courts adopted the Court’s broad interpretation of public use and applied such a rubric to condemnation challenges.161
The Court’s ruling is buttressed by the fact that state constitutions have copied the federal takings clause, which has led to widespread application of the broader conception of public use by state
courts in state eminent domain challenges.162 As Wendell Pritchett
notes, in the nineteenth century, state courts struggled to follow both
the broad and narrow conceptions of public use, particularly as their
applications by the Supreme Court were occasionally inconsistent.163 While some surveys suggest that most state challenges to
eminent domain by private property owners are based on state constitutional provisions,164 this finding does not answer whether state
courts invariably looked (and still look) to the federal provision for
guidance. Neither does it answer to what extent the Court’s public
use doctrine is applied to resolve a case. Some commentators have
noted that state courts were slower than federal courts to conform to
the Supreme Court’s broad, deferential public use doctrine.165
Thomas Merrill notes that the delay may have been due to separation
of power principles that were weaker at the state level than the federal level, “because interest groups may exert greater control over
state governments.”166 Nonetheless, it seems that a majority of state

Use Requirement of the Fifth Amendment, 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 285, 289–90
(2000); Donald J. Kochan, “Public Use” and the Independent Judiciary: Condemnation in an Interest-Group Perspective, 3 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 49, 60–61
(1998); Joseph J. Lazzarotti, Public Use or Public Abuse, 68 UMKC L. REV. 49
(1999); Errol E. Meidinger, The “Public Uses” of Eminent Domain: History and
Policy, 11 ENVTL. L. 1, 18 (1980)).
161
INST. FOR JUST., FIVE YEARS AFTER KELO: THE SWEEPING BACKLASH
AGAINST ONE OF THE SUPREME COURT’S MOST-DESPISED DECISIONS (2010),
https://ij.org/wo-content/uploads/2015/08/kelo5year_ann-white_paper.pdf;
Wesley W. Horton & Brendon P. Levesque, Kelo is Not Dred Scott, 48 CONN. L.
REV. 1405, 1420 (2016).
162
Merrill, supra note 11, at 67 n.24. North Carolina is an exception. Id.
163
Pritchett, supra note 158, at 9.
164
Merrill, supra note 11, at 67 n.24.
165
Id. at 68–69 n.30.
166
Id.
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actors responded to Berman by following the federal public use doctrine, and did so for decades.167 Indeed, “nearly all courts have settled on a broader understanding that requires only that the taking
167
City of Birmingham v. Tutwiler Drug Co., 475 So. 2d 458, 468 (Ala. 1985)
(citing Berman to explain that “[t]he role of the judiciary in determining whether
the legislature is exercising its power for a public purpose is an extremely narrow
one,” and that “[c]ourts should not determine whether a particular urban renewal
or redevelopment project is desirable”); City of Phoenix v. Superior Court, 671
P.2d 387, 393–94 (Ariz. 1983) (relying on Berman to determine that “the function
of the judiciary in determining whether an area is a slum or blighted area is to
review the findings of the governing body, rather than to make an original determination”); Arvada Urban Renewal Auth. v. Columbine Prof’l Plaza Ass’n, 85
P.3d 1066, 1073 (Colo. 2004) (en banc) (explaining that the Court’s precedent
adopted the Berman analysis before and that the “requirement ensures that condemnation actions undertaken pursuant to an urban renewal project do not run
afoul of the constitutional requirement that private property be taken only for a
public use”); Rabinoff v. Dist. Court, 360 P.2d 114, 119–20 (Colo. 1961) (en
banc) (noting that, in light of Berman, “[a]lthough the constitutional restriction [at
issue] is different, the reasoning of the Supreme Court is persuasive in that it emphasizes that the ultimate private ownership aspect does not render the scheme
invalid”); Boise Redevelopment Agency v. Yick Kong Corp., 499 P.2d 575, 579
(Idaho 1972) (noting that Berman’s interpretation of public use “has been the
nearly universal consensus of the courts”); Hous. & Redevelopment Auth. of St.
Paul v. Coleman’s Serv., Inc., 160 N.W.2d 266, 270 (Minn. 1968) (noting that
following Berman, the court has in the past “pointed out that Federal and state
statutes relating to housing, redevelopment, and urban renewal projects are constitutional in that the acquisition and clearing of blighted areas serve a public purpose”); Mayor of Vicksburg v. Thomas, 645 So. 2d 940, 942–43 (Miss. 1994)
(relying on Berman as baseline public use analysis); Paulk v. Hous. Auth. of Tupelo, 195 So. 2d 488, 490–92 (Miss. 1967) (holding, in reliance on Berman, that
it was constitutional for the municipal housing authority to condemn an owner’s
land that was located within the slum area marked for condemnation to make way
for urban renewal); City of Las Vegas Downtown Redevelopment Agency v. Pappas, 76 P.3d 1, 14 (Nev. 2003) (following Berman); Urban Renewal Agency of
Reno v. Iacometti, 379 P.2d 466, 469 (Nev. 1963) (relying on Berman to explain
that property may be taken for redevelopment); Wilson v. City of Long Branch,
142 A.2d 837, 842–43 (N.J. 1958) (noting that, based on Berman, urban redevelopment and economic development are “intimately related to the public health,
welfare, and safety and so are consonant with both Federal and State Constitutions”); Isaacs v. Oklahoma City, 437 P.2d 229, 234 (Okla. 1966) (explaining that
the Court has upheld the constitutionality of urban renewal laws that allowed postcondemnation use of the property by private interests); Romeo v. Cranston Redevelopment Agency, 254 A.2d 426, 432 (R.I. 1969) (explaining that “[p]erhaps the
single greatest contribution” to the public use doctrine is Berman); Davis v. City
of Lubbock, 326 S.W.2d 699, 703 (Tex. 1959) (explaining that, in light of Ber-
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yield some public benefit or advantage.”168 This conception drives
much of the deference state courts give to state actors, such as state
administrative agencies, exercising eminent domain.169 Between
1954 and 1986, a majority of state and federal appellate court decisions held that a government taking by eminent domain was for a
public use, analytically following the Court’s jurisprudence.170 This
is unsurprising given the broad deference granted to the Court’s public use doctrine. Many states have declined to expand takings protections beyond the Supreme Court’s minima and generally have
been amenable to the broad deference handed down in Berman and
Midkiff.171

man, “[t]he question of ‘public use,’ as far as the due process of the federal constitution is concerned, has been settled”); Miller v. City of Tacoma, 378 P.2d 464,
471 (Wash. 1963) (citing Berman to explain that “any question of public use or
due process under the federal constitution, with regard to [urban renewal] legislation, is settled”); Charleston Urban Renewal Auth. v. Courtland Co., 509 S.E.2d
569, 573 (W. Va. 1998) (relying upon the Supreme Court’s Berman decision as
“instructive” on questions related to condemnations for urban redevelopment and
blight removal).
168
DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS 196 (2002).
However, as Ilya Somin notes, “these postmortems for the narrow view turned out
to be premature” as several state supreme courts still held a narrow conception of
public use despite the Berman decision. ILYA SOMIN, THE GRASPING HAND: KELO
V. CITY OF NEW LONDON AND THE LIMITS OF EMINENT DOMAIN 60 (2015).
169
See Jones, supra note 160, at 294. The Supreme Court’s narrower conception, which gave courts de novo review over questions of the public use of eminent
domain, continued as late at the 1930s. See Paul W. Tschetter, Note, Kelo v. New
London: A Divided Court Affirms the Rational Basis Standard of Review in Evaluating Local Determinations of ‘Public Use,’ 51 S.D. L. REV. 193, 220–21 (2006).
170
See Merrill, supra note 11, at 96. Decisions upholding takings as satisfying
a public use did decrease slightly when narrowed to only state court decisions. Id.
(noting that “[l]ooking at the state appellate decisions alone, we find that 16.2%,
roughly one in six, held that a proposed taking did not serve a public use”).
171
See, e.g., Wright v. City of Palmer, 468 P.2d 326, 330–31 (Alaska 1970);
People ex rel. City of Urbana v. Paley, 368 N.E.2d 915, 921 (Ill. 1977); Green v.
City of Mt. Pleasant, 131 N.W.2d 5, 17 (Iowa 1964); Common Cause v. State,
455 A.2d 1, 25–26 (Me. 1983); City of Frostburg v. Jenkins, 136 A.2d 852, 85556 (Md. 1957); City of Pipestone v. Madsen, 178 N.W.2d 594, 600–01 (Minn.
1970); Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, 467 S.E.2d 615, 627 (N.C. 1996);
McKinney v. City of Greenville, 203 S.E.2d 680, 690 (S.C. 1974).
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Most courts that have reviewed the issue of public use under
state constitutions have adopted a broad interpretation, which is similar to the interpretation of the Supreme Court’s public use vein.172
Indeed, the “consensus of modern legislative and judicial thinking
[was] to broaden” the public purpose of takings, pursuant to Berman
and Midkiff, and include economic development.173 As the New Jersey Superior Court explained, “[c]ourts that take the broader and
more liberal view in sustaining public rights at the expense of property rights hold that ‘public use’ is synonymous with ‘public benefit,’ ‘public advantage,’ or ‘public utility.’”174 In New York, the prevailing notion has been to reaffirm the longstanding doctrine of deference to the broad conception.175 Many states also take the position
that ultimate use by the public is not necessary.176 For example, the
172

Pappas, 76 P.3d at 10; see also 2A JULIUS L. SACKMUN, NICHOLS ON EM7-33, 7-36 (Matthew Bender ed., 3d ed. 2017).
173
Faulconer v. City of Danville, 232 S.W.2d 80, 83 (Ky. 1950).
174
County of Essex v. Hindenlang, 114 A.2d 461, 469 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1955).
175
Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721, 730 (N.Y. 2010)
(reaffirming the longstanding doctrine of legislative deference in New York,
meaning that so long as the legislature makes rational, nonarbitrary determinations as to blight and public purpose, the judiciary will not substitute its judgment
for that of the legislative body).
176
The majority of state courts take this broader view. See, e.g., Cohen v. Larson, 867 P.2d 956, 958 (Idaho 1993) (“The proposed use need not be strictly public, but it must at least benefit the public welfare or the economy of the state. The
notion of public use is a flexible one depending on the needs and wants of the
community.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)); Green v. High Ridge Ass’n,
695 A.2d 125, 129 (Md. 1997) (noting that “‘public use’ is not limited to circumstances where ‘the public . . . literally or physically [is] permitted to use the property taken by eminent domain.’” (omission and alteration in original)); Pappas,
76 P.3d at 11; Township of West Orange v. 769 Assocs., L.L.C., 800 A.2d 86, 91
(N.J. 2002) (“[I]t is not essential that the entire community or even any considerable portion of the community directly enjoy or participate in the condemned
property for the taking to constitute a ‘public use.’”); Hindenlang, 114 A.2d at
468 (“The number of people who will participate in or benefit by the use for which
the property is to be condemned is not the determinant of whether the use is or is
not a public one.”); Carolina Tel. & Tel. Co. v. McLeod, 364 S.E.2d 399, 402
(N.C. 1988) (“[I]t is ‘immaterial’ if the use is limited to citizens of a certain location or that few people will in fact exercise the right to use. The key point . . . is
that the use is ‘open to all who choose to avail themselves of it. The mere fact that
the advantage of the use inures to a particular individual . . . will not deprive it of
its public character.’” (citations omitted) (second omission in original) (quoting
Dyer v. Tex. Elec. Serv. Co., 680 S.W.2d 883, 885 (Tex. App. 1984))); Grice v.
INENT DOMAIN § 7.02[3], at
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Colorado Supreme Court, in Rabinoff v. District Court ex rel. Denver, noted that the Berman decision was persuasive in emphasizing
that ultimate private ownership does not render a redevelopment
scheme invalid.177 Similarly, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has
called Berman the “single greatest contribution to the expanded
view of” public use doctrine.178 The Idaho Supreme Court has stated
that Berman has the “near[] universal consensus of the [state]
courts.”179 As for economic development as a justifiable public use,
courts have consistently found that the removal of economic stagnation satisfies the public use test under both federal and state constitutions.180 Of course, economic development was rejected by most
states post-Kelo. 181 Eminent domain for economic development purposes became the most recent heavy-handed legislative supplement
to provide greater constitutional protections than the federal baseline.182
As in regulatory takings, there are, of course, exceptions to public use conformity. While most state courts rule in accordance with
the Supreme Court’s broad interpretation of the federal Takings
Clause, there are a few states that still take a narrower approach.
Vt. Elec. Power Co., 956 A.2d 561, 571 (Vt. 2008) (“It is not necessary to a public
use that the whole public, or any considerable portion of it, participate in it; the
use may be, and frequently is, limited to a small locality, and yet be public in a
constitutional sense.” (quoting Deerfield River Co. v. Wilmington Power & Paper
Co., 77 A. 862, 864 (Vt. 1910))).
177
360 P.2d 114, 124 (Colo. 1961).
178
Romeo v. Cranston Redevelopment Agency, 254 A.2d 426, 432 (R.I.
1969).
179
Boise Redevelopment Agency v. Yick Kong Corp., 499 P.2d 575, 579
(Idaho 1972).
180
City of Jamestown v. Leevers Supermarkets, Inc., 552 N.W.2d 365, 369
(N.D. 1996); see also State ex rel. Tomasic v. Unified Gov’t of Wyandotte Cty.,
962 P.2d 543, 554 (Kan. 1998) (holding that economic development is a valid
public use); City of Duluth v. State, 390 N.W.2d 757, 767 (Minn. 1986) (finding
economic development to be a valid public use and noting that “after permitting
so much new development in the Twin Cities area where an economic boom may
be said to be in progress, it hardly seems appropriate to apply a more stringent
rule”); City of Midwest City v. House of Realty, Inc., 100 P.3d 678, 686 (Okla.
2004) (noting that generally, economic development is valid public use).
181
See SOMIN, supra note 168, at 178–79 (discussing bans on economic development takings). See infra Part III.
182
See Krier & Sterk, supra note 8, at 78 n.171.
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Some state courts acknowledge that the public use clause in their
state constitutions offers greater protections than the federal counterpart.183 South Dakota, for example, has consistently offered
greater protections beyond the federal baseline. Its courts, in interpreting the state constitution’s takings clause, have employed the
“use by the public” test.184 This test requires that there be a “use or
right of use on the part of the public or some limited portion of it.”185
Prior to Kelo, only eight states determined that the Takings Clause
placed stricter limitations above the federal baseline.186 In Bailey v.
Myers, the Arizona Supreme Court recognized that decisions based
183
Lynda J. Oswald, The Role of Deference in Judicial Review of Public Use
Determinations, 39 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 243, 247–48 (2012).
184
Krier v. Dell Rapids Township, 709 N.W.2d 841, 846 (S.D. 2006) (citing
Benson v. State, 710 N.W.2d 121, 146 (S.D. 2006)).
185
Ill. Cent. R. Co. v. E. Sioux Falls Quarry Co., 144 N.W. 724, 728 (S.D.
1913).
186
See Bailey v. Myers, 76 P.3d 898, 901 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (holding taking of property was not for “public use” pursuant to “significant limitations on the
power of eminent domain” in Arizona Takings Clause); City of Little Rock v.
Raines, 411 S.W.2d 486, 494–95 (Ark. 1967) (determining condemnation for the
purpose of “industrial development” fails to satisfy the state constitutional public
use limitation); Baycol v. Downtown Dev. Auth., 315 So. 2d 451, 457 (Fla. 1975)
(construing Florida Constitution’s public use clause as prohibiting the exercise of
eminent domain for private use); Sw. Ill. Dev. Auth. v. Nat’l City Envtl., L.L.C.,
768 N.E.2d 1, 7, 11 (Ill. 2002) (holding condemnation for economic development
alone would not achieve a legitimate public use and was unconstitutional under
the Illinois Takings Clause which provided that private property shall not be taken
or damaged for public use without just compensation to its owner); Opinion of
the Justices, 131 A.2d 904, 907 (Me. 1957) (holding a proposed Maine statute
authorizing takings for the purpose of “industrial development . . . [for] the betterment of the economy of the city” was an unconstitutional taking for private use
and not a public purpose under Maine takings clause, providing that “[p]rivate
property shall not be taken for public uses without just compensation; nor unless
the public exigencies require it”); County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d
765, 788 (Mich. 2004) (Weaver, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(finding eminent domain for purposes of economic development unconstitutional
because they do not advance a public use under the Michigan takings clause,
providing that “[p]rivate property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation”); Karesh v. City Council of Charleston, 247 S.E.2d 342, 342–44
(S.C. 1978) (stating that South Carolina courts expressly adhere to a “strict interpretation” of state Takings Clause restricting the power of eminent domain to the
taking of private property for “public use”); Somin, Post-Kelo Reform, supra note
32, at 196 (“The state of Utah banned both economic development takings and
blight condemnations . . . before Kelo was decided.”).
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on the federal Constitution and most state constitutions regarding
“the purposes for which private property may be taken and as to
what constitutes a public use, are not controlling in this state, and,
indeed, lend us but little aid.”187 Relatedly, the Washington State
Supreme Court acknowledged that its public use clause differs from
the federal one, affording its residents expansive constitutional
property rights.188 So, while a majority of states have followed Berman’s broad conception of public use, some have departed to provide property owners more protections from eminent domain.
This much is known: state courts gravitate toward the same public use and regulatory taking analytical frameworks and tests, and
decline to venture above the constitutional bottom or pull the floor
of protections a little higher.189 But, do state legislatures that follow
the Court’s takings doctrine offer greater protections or craft their
own regulatory takings formulation? While some may attempt to
craft statutory provisions that divert from or provide greater protections to constitutional property, most fail to substantively move the
needle (or pull the floor of protections higher).

187

Bailey, 76 P.3d at 903 (quoting Inspiration Consol. Copper Co. v. New
Keystone Copper Co., 144 P. 227, 278 (Ariz. 1914)).
188
State ex rel. Wash. State Convention & Trade Ctr. v. Evans, 966 P.2d 1252,
1261 (Wash. 1998) (en banc).
189
The analyses of state appellate and supreme court decisions is not an exhaustive empirical study of state regulatory takings cases. Instead they comprise
a review of many state appellate and mostly state supreme court rulings, where
courts faced a regulatory takings challenge and, more often than not, seemed to
evaluate the claims either under both state and federal takings doctrine simultaneously (giving great weight to the Supreme Court’s takings doctrine and tests) or
exclusively under the federal test (and declining to apply state doctrine). The Tennessee Supreme Court’s opinion in Phillips v. Montgomery County and its citations to states that conform to and diverge from federal regulatory takings doctrine
is a useful starting point for understanding the extent of the conformity across the
states for applying the Court’s regulatory takings doctrine. 442 S.W.3d 233, 240
n.10 (Tenn. 2014). More research and studies, like the one conducted by James
Krier and Stewart Sterk, are necessary to fully grasp the extent of the conformity
argued in this Article. See generally Krier & Sterk, supra note 8. At the very least,
the case law research illustrates the operation of the general gravitational phenomenon of the federal regulatory takings doctrine at the state level.
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2. STATE LEGISLATURES AND TAKINGS STATUTES
Frank Michelman and Robert Ellickson have urged state legislators to become more active in shaping takings doctrine.190 Perhaps
state legislatures are “better able than courts to deal with [takings]
issues comprehensively” and to “create new procedures.”191 If state
courts seem to gravitate to the federal takings doctrine, do state legislatures exercise their sovereign independence to enact takings legislation to provide greater protections? The story is mostly the same
as state courts—conformity.
Indeed, conformity with regulatory takings doctrine is the norm,
but it is also evident that there is a genuine lack of interest, willingness, and ability (or failed lobbying) on the part of legislators to figure out how best to raise the floor on property protections from regulations.192 For example, in the 1990s, state elected officials began
enacting property rights protections laws in what has become known
as the property rights movement aimed at reining in perceived regulatory excesses.193 At the time, the “regulatory-takings issue” had
never been “more legislatively salient.”194 By 1997, fifteen states
adopted takings assessment statutes requiring regulatory agencies to
prepare an evaluation of state actions and proposed mitigation ef190

Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the
Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165,
1245–57 (1967).
191
Robert C. Ellickson, Takings Legislation: A Comment, 20 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 75, 80–81 (1996) [hereinafter, Ellickson, Takings Legislation].
192
Kirk Emerson & Charles R. Wise, Statutory Approaches to Regulatory
Takings: State Property Rights Legislation Issues and Implications for Public Administration, 57 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 411, 412–13 (1997) (“Property rights legislation is being introduced and adopted by the states at a dramatic rate . . . . The
assessment provisions and the compensation measures present the more distinct
and creative statutory approaches . . . . The majority of the 36 adopted statutes
take one of these two forms. However, these statutes are increasingly becoming
hybrid forms of legislation that combine more than one approach.”).
193
See id. Emerson and Wise found that in a five-year period, more than half
of the fifty states adopted some form of provision for the protection of private
property rights, and since 1991, property rights legislation was proposed in all
states. Id. at 412. Their research found 250 bills proposed during that time period,
approximately 120 of which were introduced in the 1995 session in forty-two state
legislatures. Id. Twenty-six states have enacted thirty-nine measures since 1991.
Id.
194
Ellickson, Takings Legislation, supra note 191, at 75.
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forts for actions that might implicate regulatory takings or other violations.195 A few other states enacted “compensation statutes,”
which established tests to identify regulatory takings and when they
rise to the level requiring compensation.196 However, only a handful
of state legislatures enacted statutes that granted protections greater
than the federal takings doctrine.197 These few states enacted statutes
that have turned out to be mostly symbolic; they might, as a matter
195

See Mark W. Cordes, Leapfrogging the Constitution: The Rise of State
Takings Legislation, 24 Ecology L. Q. 187, 204 (1997) (“To date at least fifteen
states have enacted some type of assessment statute and assessment legislation
has been introduced in numerous other states in the last several years.”).
196
See, e.g, Bert J. Harris, Jr., Private Property Rights Protection Act, ch. 95181, 1995 Fla. Laws 1652 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 70.001 (2017)); Private Real
Property Rights Preservation Act, ch. 517, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 3266 (codified
at TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 2007.001–2007.026 (West 1995)). Compensation
statutes are analyzed in Recent Legislation, Land-Use Regulation—Compensation
Statutes—Florida Creates Cause of Action for Compensation of Property Owners
When Regulation Imposes “Inordinate Burden,” 109 HARV. L. REV. 542 (1995).
197
The Mississippi statute applies to any action by the state that “prohibits or
severely limits the right of an owner to conduct forestry or agricultural activities
on forest or agricultural land.” MISS. CODE ANN. § 49-33-7(e) (2018). The Louisiana statute gives a right of action to “[a]n owner of private agricultural property.” LA. STAT. ANN. § 3:3610(A) (2018). The Florida statute is not more expansive than the existing federal constitutional doctrine; it applies to government action that “has inordinately burdened an existing use of real property or a vested
right to a specific use of real property.” FLA. STAT. § 70.001(2) (2018). Texas’s
statute applies to governmental action that causes “a reduction of at least 25 percent in the market value of the affected private real property.” TEX. GOV’T CODE
ANN. § 2007.002(5)(B)(ii) (West 2017). In Arizona, if the enforcement of a land
use law “reduces the fair market value of the property the owner is entitled to just
compensation,” but all laws that limit land use “for the protection of the public’s
health and safety” are exempted. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1134(A)–(B)(1)
(2018). The Oregon statute exempts regulations “[t]hat restrict or prohibit activities for the protection of public health and safety.” OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 195.305(3)(b) (West 2018) (originally codified as OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 197.352 (West 2005)). The Oregon statute, which was the result of voter initiatives, is an outlier in this group of states to enact symbolic laws providing greater
protections to landowners in regulatory takings. The Oregon initiatives have had
impacts on land use within the state. The statute provides that “[i]f a public entity
enacts one or more land use regulations that restrict the residential use of private
real property . . . and that reduce the fair market value of the property, then the
owner of the property shall be entitled to just compensation.” OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 195.305(1) (West 2018).
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of text, demand compensation where federal regulatory takings doctrine does not require it, but they have led to few takings victories.198
For example, Tennessee enacted a law based on an assessment
measure specifying the conditions under which a takings judgment
would be levied against the state for certain regulatory activities.199
Based on guidelines prepared by the U.S. Attorney General from a
federal executive order,200 the law, like other state takings legislation language, is more style than substance.201 It simply states that
the guidelines for assessing regulatory activity of the state shall be
based “on current law as articulated by the United States Supreme
Court and the supreme court of the state.”202 The Tennessee guidelines and other property protection laws seem to simply toe the line
and “restate some of the broad principles stated in the . . . Supreme

198

Krier & Sterk, supra note 8, at 78.
Emerson & Wise, supra note 192, at 414.
200
Id. (noting that “most of the assessment laws followed by states are patterned after Executive Order No. 12,630” (citing Exec. Order No. 12,630, 53 Fed.
Reg. 8,859 (Mar. 18, 1988), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1988))). The order required “federal agencies to analyze policies and actions and to perform a takings
impact analysis.” Emerson & Wise, supra note 192, at 414. These analyses would
then be used for decision making in the regulatory review process, ostensibly to
prevent unnecessary takings and to budget for those actions that necessarily involve takings. Id. “The Attorney General issued guidelines implementing the executive order.” Id. However, as Emerson and Wise note, the order failed to become fully operational. Id.
201
Lynda J. Oswald, Property Rights Legislation and the Police Power, 37
AM. BUS. L.J. 527, 542–43 n.64 (2000). Tennessee’s statute’s stated purpose is
“not . . . to enlarge or to reduce the scope of private property protection afforded
by the constitution of the United States or Tennessee,” but to “provide a mechanism for education of, and consideration by, state agencies and the public regarding what government actions may result in an unconstitutional taking of private
property,” and requiring that guidelines issued under the statute be based “on current law as articulated by the United States Supreme Court and the supreme court
of Tennessee.” TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 12-1-201–204 (2018). Oswald notes that
other states seem to mirror the Tennessee language. Oswald, supra, at 542–43
n.64 (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-704 (2017) (ordering the state attorney general
to develop takings guidelines based on “current law as articulated” by the U.S.
and state supreme courts); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 24.423 (2018) (ordering the attorney general to “develop takings assessment guidelines” based upon “current
law as articulated” by the United States and state supreme courts)).
202
Emerson & Wise, supra note 192, at 414–15; see Oswald, supra note 202,
at 542–43 n.64.
199
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Court [regulatory takings] cases.”203 Additionally, Utah requires
that state agencies establish and review their guidelines based on
recent takings cases in an effort “to maintain consistency with court
rulings.”204
One notable exception is Idaho, which enacted a property rights
protections law that involves assessing state regulatory takings; the
law is significantly more protective than the federal standard.205 The
law arguably goes “beyond the extant of the Supreme Court [regulatory takings] doctrine”206 by prohibiting regulatory actions that
“result in an unconstitutional taking of private property.”207 But state
agencies, under the law, are to conduct a takings impact assessment,
using specified guidelines, prior to taking legal or equitable actions.208
Interestingly, there is evidence that states have included local
governments in some property protection legislation where assessment guidelines have been imposed.209 These statutes, however, also
encourage local governments to “follow property protections afforded by the federal and state constitutions.”210 But, if the statutes
rehash the Supreme Court’s regulatory takings tests and encourage
state and local governments to “follow” the tests, then the statutes
provide little legal significance and function only as symbolic gestures.211
Even in the context of just compensation legislation, few state
legislatures have offered protections beyond traditional avenues of
relief, such as constitutional challenges of inverse condemnation,
which is when a plaintiff-landowner sues the government for payment because government actions or regulations fail to pay just compensation. In Mississippi, for example, a property owner can seek
takings compensation for a state action if the state action reduces
greater than forty percent (40%) in the fair market value of, among
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211

Emerson & Wise, supra note 192, at 415.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63L-3-201 (LexisNexis 2018).
Emerson & Wise, supra note 192, at 415.
Id.; see also Oswald, supra note 202, at 542–43 n.64.
IDAHO CODE § 67-8003 (2018).
Emerson & Wise, supra note 192, at 415.
Id. at 415–16.
Id. at 416 (emphasis added).
See id. at 416.
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other things, personal property rights associated with conducting
forestry or agricultural activities on the forest or agricultural land.212
Texas enacted a statute where a compensable taking constitutes
twenty-five percent (25%) diminution in the market value of private
property, including groundwater or surface water rights.213 The
Texas statute goes beyond the constitutional floor “and extends the
sway of these statutory thresholds considerably.”214 The problem,
however, with these statutes—which are the exception and not the
rule—is that they “incorporate some consideration of private property rights into existing procedures,” but fail to specify definitions
and instructions on how to actually quantify the percentage of burdensome regulations imposed on private property.215 As Ellickson
notes, “a percentage threshold poorly reflects the fairness concerns
that underlie takings law” because state takings clauses aim (but
usually fail) to prevent horizontal inequity caused by state action
imposing economic burdens on “a few citizens” rather than dispersing such burdens through the tax system.216
The latitude afforded to state courts and state legislatures to protect property rights217 beyond the constitutional bottom is simply not
bearing out the way the likes of Justice Brandeis218 or Justice Brennan219 would have envisioned. Instead, state actors seem to adhere
to longstanding Supreme Court takings doctrine to resolve takings
disputes.220 Why most state actors have resisted the opportunity to
provide greater protections beyond the federal minima like the Minnesota Supreme Court or the Texas state legislature is somewhat unclear, but as further explained in Part III, it is probably due to the
type of property interest at issue and the landowner litigating the
case. 221
212
213
214
215
216
217

Id.
Id.
Id. at 417.
Id. at 414.
Ellickson, Takings Legislation, supra note 191, at 82.
See, e.g., Phillips v. Montgomery County, 442 S.W.3d 233, 242 (Tenn.

2014).
218

See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 420–21 (1922) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
219
See Brennan, State Constitutions, supra note 58, at 491.
220
Phillips, 442 S.W.3d at 244.
221
See, e.g., Buhmann v. State, 201 P.3d 70, 88–89 (Mont. 2008) (noting that
the Montana Constitution does not provide any greater constitutional protection
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Like state courts, state legislatures have also tended to draft and
enact eminent domain statutes to fit the mold of the Court’s public
use doctrine.222 Prior to the Berman ruling, for example, a “majority
of states passed redevelopment acts” which authorized local agencies to exercise broad discretion to condemn private property, particularly for blight and slum clearance for private redevelopment
purposes.223 What made these statutes, codified in the 1940s, different from previous eminent domain legislation is that they departed
from the rather narrow conception of “public use,” such as takings
for highways or roads, and instead “required that, after land was set
aside for public infrastructure, the cleared property be transferred to
private developers.”224 Some statutes went as far as to expressly
convince courts of the constitutionality of an eminent domain provision to give urban renewal projects, for example, priority over
condemnation for building schools, parks, or other public works.225
Indeed, the power to condemn was central to many redevelopment
acts. The District of Columbia Redevelopment Act, which was at

against the regulatory taking of private property than the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, and thus state courts will not grant more protections
beyond).
222
See ALA. CODE § 11-47-170(b) (2018); ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.240 (2017);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §12-1111 (2018); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 38-1-101(1)(b)(I),
(2)(b) (2017); FLA. STAT. § 73.014 (2018); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 22-1-1(1), (9)
(2018); IDAHO CODE § 7-701A (2018); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 30/5-5-5 (2018); IND.
CODE §§ 32-24-4.5-1, 7 (2018); IOWA CODE §§ 6A.21, .22 (2018) (prohibiting taking of property for private use without owner’s consent); KAN. STAT. §§ 26-501a,
501b(e) (2017); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 416.675 (West 2018); ME. STAT. tit. 1, §
816 (2017); MINN. STAT. § 117.012 (2017); MO. REV. STAT. § 523.271 (2018);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-30-102 (2017); NEV. REV. STAT. § 37.010 (2017); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 162-K:2.IX-a, 205:1-b (2018); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 3-18-10,
60A-10 (2018); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-503(2a) (2017); N.D. CENT. CODE § 3215-01 (2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §1.08 (West 2018); OR. REV. STAT. § 35.385
(2017); 26 PA. CONS. STAT. § 204 (2018); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 11-7-22.1
(2018); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-102 (2018); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §
2206.001 (West 2017); VA. CODE ANN. § 1-219.1 (2018); W. VA. CODE ANN. §
16-18-6a (2017); WIS. STAT. § 32.03(6)(b) (2018); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-26-801
(2018).
223
Pritchett, supra note 158, at 32.
224
Id.
225
Id.
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issue in Berman, was a typical example of how other states expanded the public use doctrine within state legislation authorizing
the expropriation and acquisition of substandard housing and blight
for redevelopment a “public use.”226
B.
Divergence in Public Use Vein Post-Kelo
The real puzzle of this Article’s narrative is not conformity. Instead, the main crux of this Article is a rare instance of divergence
that upended the collective understanding of state conformity in takings doctrine. There is one notable exception where divergence from
this longstanding gravitational conformity caused a schism in constitutional property—Kelo v. City of New London.227 This centrifugal episode marked a distinct moment in constitutional property that
has led to a fascinating disequilibrium in takings: regulatory takings
doctrine has remained immune from a resistance movement at the
state level, while the public use doctrine has experienced perhaps
one of the most notable examples of state divergence from federal
constitutional law.228
1. THE KELO RULING
In the five-to-four Kelo decision, the Court upheld economic development takings as a justifiable public use.229 Delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Stevens stated that a long-standing “policy
of deference to legislative judgments in this field” colored the
Court’s decision to remain above the fray, and where condemnation
determinations arise, the Court would defer to the legislature.230 The
majority took the safe route, noting that courts should not secondguess local governments’ judgments regarding the efficacy of proposed economic development plans.231 Justice Stevens noted that
the “needs of society have varied between different parts of the Na-

226

District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945, ch. 736, § 2, 60 Stat.
790, 790–91 (1946).
227
545 U.S. 469 (2005).
228
See infra Part III.
229
Somin, Limits of Backlash, supra note 32, at 2107 (citing Kelo, 545 U.S.
at 489–90).
230
Id. (citing Kelo, 545 U.S. at 480).
231
Id. at 2108 (citing Kelo, 545 U.S. at 488–89).
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tion” and that courts should exercise “great respect” for state legislatures and state courts in discerning local public needs.232 Nothing
about the decision was a surprise, and it was expected that state
courts would continue to gravitate towards federal public use doctrine the same way they had done for decades prior to Kelo.233
But that is not what happened: state legislatures railed against
the decision, arguing that economic development was not a justifiable public use.234 But, Justice Stevens’s opinion reminded states that
they were not tied to the decision.235 He noted that if dissatisfied
with the decision, state legislatures could amend or state courts
could interpret their eminent domain laws to offer greater protections,236 citing the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision in County of
Wayne v. Hathcock237 as an example of a state court bucking the
trend to invalidate economic development takings.238 States took
Justice Stevens’s reminder to heart, embarking on a historic campaign of resistance.239
2. CENTRIFUGAL EPISODE
Following the Kelo decision, an unprecedented wave of eminent
domain reform that either barred or restricted economic development takings swept the nation. Forty state legislatures amended their
232

Kelo, 545 U.S. at 482.
See supra notes 162–68 and accompanying text for a discussion of how
states gravitated toward the federal framework.
234
See Somin, Limits of Backlash, supra note 32, at 2101–02.
235
See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489.
236
Id. Justice Stevens noted:
We emphasize that nothing in our opinion precludes any State
from placing further restrictions on its exercise of the takings
power. Indeed, many States already impose “public use” requirements that are stricter than the federal baseline. Some of
these requirements have been established as a matter of state
constitutional law, while others are expressed in state eminent
domain statutes that carefully limit the grounds upon which takings may be exercised.
Id.
237
684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).
238
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489 n.22.
239
See Somin, Limits of Backlash, supra note 32, at 2103 (calling the backlash
“massive and unprecedented”).
233
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eminent domain statutes to restrict or bar the exercise of eminent
domain in some capacity.240 Thirty states redefined “public use” and
“public purpose” to distinguish themselves from the broad economic
development justifications.241 Eleven other states followed suit,
amending their state constitutions to be more restrictive on public
use takings than the federal Constitution and the Supreme Court.242
This countervailing influence at the state level continued beyond
the state legislatures and into state courts, albeit to a lesser extent. In
the three states that did not amend their constitutions or enact restrictive legislation, their highest courts ruled to grant greater protections against takings for private use.243 State courts in seven other
states with statutory amendments to eminent domain codes ruled to
impose additional protections beyond the federal public use doctrine.244 The South Dakota Supreme Court outright rejected Kelo altogether, explaining that its constitution offer stricter standards than
the federal minima by giving “landowners more protection against
the taking of their property.”245 That court concluded that “public
use” requires actual use of the condemned property by the government or the general public.246
The Missouri Supreme Court, for example, held that an economic development taking was impermissible under its post-Kelo
statute.247 The Ohio Supreme Court in City of Norwood v. Horney
favorably referenced the Kelo dissents as more appropriate for interpreting the Ohio Constitution’s public use clause, noting “we are not
bound to follow the U.S. Supreme Court’s determinations of the
scope of the Public Use Clause in the federal Constitution.”248 And
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Reading Area Water Authority
240

Dana Berliner, Looking Back Ten Years After Kelo, 125 YALE L.J. FORUM
82, 84 (2015) (citing states that amended their eminent domain statutes).
241
Id. at 85 (citing states that redefined their statutory language).
242
Id. at 84 (citing states that amended their state constitutions).
243
Id. at 88.
244
Id.
245
See Benson v. State, 710 N.W.2d 131, 146 (S.D. 2006).
246
Id. at 163.
247
State ex rel. Jackson v. Dolan, 398 S.W.3d 472, 481–82 (Mo. 2013).
248
City of Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1136–37, 1140–41 (Ohio
2006) (holding that economic development is not a public use under the Ohio
Constitution and also constitutionally limiting the use of redevelopment designations).
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v. Schuykill River Greenway Ass’n, relied upon the statutory definition of public use, noting that the federal public use clause was immaterial to the state’s determination.249 The court noted, “we need
not decide the constitutional issue because, even if we assume the
condemnation can pass Fifth-Amendment scrutiny, to be valid it
must also be statutorily permissible.”250 The Oklahoma Supreme
Court relied upon its constitutional amendment to the takings clause
to reject Kelo, noting that to follow Kelo would “blur the line between ‘public’ and ‘private’ so as to render our constitutional limitations on the power of eminent domain a nullity.”251 Indeed, after
the Kelo decision, “federalism is alive and well.”252
3. DISEQUILIBRIUM
The post-Kelo rupture in federalism was a significant transformation in constitutional property. While scholars have debated the
extent of the Kelo “revolution,” the decision nonetheless gave rise
to an imbalance in federalism and takings doctrine.253 Reform efforts were counterintuitive and unexpected in light of the historical

249

100 A.3d 572, 582 (Pa. 2014).
Id. at 582. The court continued, “[i]n this regard, it may be observed that,
in the wake of Kelo, the General Assembly enacted PRPA [the Property Rights
Protection Act], which contains a salient, affirmative prohibition on the taking of
private property ‘in order to use it for private enterprise.’” Id. (quoting 26 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 204(a) (2018)).
251
Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Muskogee Cty. v. Lowery, 136 P.3d 639, 652
(Okla. 2006).
252
See Horton & Levesque, supra note 161, at 1424.
253
Bethany Berger, Kelo and the Constitutional Revolution that Wasn’t, 48
CONN. L. REV. 1429, 1436 (2016). Bethany Berger cautions against the notion
that Kelo was a revolution. Id. She argues that economic development takings are
still valid under federal law and the state response has been exaggerated by scholars. Id. She points to the blight loopholes, many of which Ilya Somin has identified, as symptomatic of the “facade” of the reforms and argues that Kelo had “little
impact on the law.” Id.; see Somin, Limits of Backlash, supra note 32, at 2120.
But, this is arguably unpersuasive when viewed in light of the sheer volume of
political and legal action by state legislatures and state courts. See Somin, Limits
of Backlash, supra note 32, at 2102–02. The extent of state action—legislative
reform, constitutional reform, and state court resistance—was quite astonishing.
Id.
250
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context in which states gravitated towards the Supreme Court’s public use jurisprudence on economic development-related takings.254
The surprise caused by these reform efforts was largely due to the
history of state following, especially around broad conceptions of
public use.255 Recall that the Court’s Berman decision corralled
thirty-four state supreme courts to mimic, adopt, and apply the
Court’s broad interpretation of public use.256 It was anticipated,
based on a history of conformity, that after Kelo, states would continue to write the prevailing public use script and slavishly imitate
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence much like they did after Berman
and Midkiff.257 Instead, the very opposite occurred.258 States quickly
dismissed the Court’s broad conception in the Kelo decision.259 The
public use doctrine, unlike the regulatory takings doctrine, was suddenly anathema.
This is not to say that the entire public use doctrine was undermined or threatened by the post-Kelo, state-level reform. Traditional
public use takings are permitted in most states.260 But economic development of the type opposed by states post-Kelo was often a key
component of the claimed public use for local governments.261 This
was indeed a seismic shift from the traditional understanding of federalism and eminent domain takings.262 While the legislative reproach to Kelo was more significant than the judicial, state court
254

See supra Section II.B.
See id.
256
See id.
257
See id. for a discussion of state conformity in public use doctrine.
258
See supra Section II.B.2.
259
Id.
260
See Daniel B. Kelly, The “Public Use” Requirement in Eminent Domain
Law: A Rationale Based on Secret Purchases and Private Influence, 92 CORNELL
L. REV. 1, 45–46 (noting that “most states actually utilize ‘quick take’ procedures
in which the government can acquire and demolish a person’s home or business
before the opportunity for a hearing”).
261
See supra Section II.B.
262
See Somin, Limits of Backlash, supra note 32, at 2102 (explaining legislative reaction to Kelo). Some have argued that a trend away from federal public
use doctrine began in the 1980s as part of the property rights movement. See, e.g.,
JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 155–70 (3d ed. 2008) (describing increased support for property rights during this period); Nancie G. Marzulla, The Property
Rights Movement: How It Began and Where It Is Headed, in LAND RIGHTS: THE
1990S’ PROPERTY RIGHTS REBELLION 1, 13–17 (noting that the Ronald Reagan
255
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decisions refusing to apply Kelo acted in repudiation of the gravitational force of federal public use doctrine.263 Nonetheless, the Takings Clause has been ruptured; regulatory takings doctrine and its
murky analytical frameworks continue to be followed by the majority of state supreme courts and state legislatures, while the post-Kelo
backlash against a broad interpretation of public use has caused a
disequilibrium in constitutional property.264
Why state courts, generally, are reluctant to independently pursue a different doctrinal course than the one offered by the nation’s
highest court is any one’s guess. 265 But, we are not in the business
of guessing. Instead, the more interesting question is why did states
abruptly dismiss the Court’s broad conception of public use in Kelo?
The regulatory takings muddle created by the Court may be precisely why states prefer to dutifully follow the federal lead. The
looming prospect of going it alone to carve out a separate doctrine
beyond the Supreme Court’s confusing doctrinal baseline may be
too risky or daunting.266 Still, why continue to mimic a doctrinal
muddle like regulatory takings when most scholars agree that the
level of anxiety the doctrine generates year in and year out is arguably unnecessary?267 The necessity for analytical and cognitive creativity to carve a new regulatory takings path (or to simply reject
administration aided the growth of the property rights movement in the 1980s).
The inertial resistance against federal public use doctrine was, arguably, beginning to take shape ten years prior to the Kelo decision, where state courts started
to find that their state constitutions prohibited economic development takings.
See, e.g., Sw. Ill. Dev. Auth. v. Nat’l City Envtl., L.L.C., 768 N.E.2d 1, 9, 11 (Ill.
2002) (holding that a contribution to positive economic growth was not a public
use); County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 778–87 (Mich. 2004) (invalidating economic development takings under the Michigan Constitution); City
of Bozeman v. Vaniman, 898 P.2d 1208, 1214 (Mont. 1995) (holding that takings
that transfer private property to private businesses, unless incidental to a public
project, was not a public use); Ga. Dep’t of Transp. v. Jasper County, 586 S.E.2d
853, 856 (S.C. 2003) (holding that a substantial projection of economic benefit
could not justify a condemnation).
263
See supra Section II.B.
264
Id.
265
Dodson, supra note 1, at 711.
266
Id. at 744 (reasoning that the history of state following makes following
easier and more acceptable).
267
See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain Apart, 2004 MICH.
ST. L. REV. 957, 981 (calling analysis of the regulatory takings doctrine “anxiety-
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such a claim altogether) is indeed daunting for state courts, so many
may prefer caution over ambition.268
Is the disequilibrium, i.e. greater divergence, a result of state
courts realization that the public use analytical framework is just an
easier target to diverge from the Court than regulatory takings doctrine? The sacrificial lamb, so to speak? Indeed, many will agree that
the analytical process of determining public use (whether using a
broad conception or narrow conception) is a much easier task than a
court or litigant winding its way through confusing, inconsistent and
arguably needless tests to determine whether government action is a
“taking” rather than, say, simply a substantive due process concern
like it was prior to Mahon.269 And, why were there the few instances
of divergence amidst widespread convergence to federal takings
doctrine prior to the Kelo rupture? What is it about these few outlier
state supreme courts that make them so willing and able to depart
from the high court? More importantly, why is there this historic rift
post-Kelo?
4. A POLITICAL ECONOMY EXPLANATION
Perhaps the reason for disequilibrium in public use rather than
regulatory takings post-Kelo, boils down to the political economy;
that is, the specific property interest held by the landowner-challenger and the electorates perception of underprotections to specific
forms of property ownership. American law holds the home and
homeowners to elevated status.270 Indeed, the federal Constitution,
along with state constitutions and statutory law “recognize the home
as a special place worth preserving.”271 Ben Barros explains that the

inducing”); Marc R. Poirier, The Virtue of Vagueness in Takings Doctrine, 24
CARDOZO L. REV. 93, 107–29 (2002) (noting the “vagueness in takings doctrine”); Rose, supra note 109, at 566 (arguing that the analysis for regulatory takings is “deeply flawed”); Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1081
(1993) (stating that “[t]akings law is out of joint” and is a “doctrine-in-most-desperate-need-of-a-principle prize”).
268
See Dodson, supra note 1, at 730, 739.
269
See, e.g., Fennell, supra note 267, at 981.
270
See Gerald S. Dickinson, The Puzzle of the Constitutional Home (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 36) (on file with author).
271
John Fee, Eminent Domain and the Sanctity of Home, 81 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 783, 787 (2006).
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home is “treated more favorably”272 than other types of property.
This is largely a result, as Margaret Radin explains, of the home being held as “inextricably part of the individual, the family, and the
fabric of society.”273 Indeed, the “home occupies a special place in
the pantheon of constitutional rights.”274 The Supreme Court, likewise, has “manifest[ed] a special concern with the protection of the
home.”275 It makes sense, then, that a crucial Supreme Court ruling
seemingly disregarding the home and arguably underprotecting the
locus, specifically Ms. Kelo’s, was enough to arouse the electorates
collective conception of the home as a special property interest
worth protecting.276
Thus, the dichotomy of divergence and convergence post-Kelo
turns, persuasively, on the profile of the property owner challenging
a regulation as a taking or condemnation—homeowner or developer.
Recall Berman and Midkiff. Arguably, neither the plaintiffs nor the
specific takings involved in those cases were conducive for a statelevel backlash. Why? One view is that the property owners affected
by eminent domain did not concern an involuntary taking from a
homeowner.277 In Midkiff, the taking was for the purpose of breaking
up a land oligopoly where the transfer resulted in rental homes being
taken from landlords.278 Berman dealt with the exercise of eminent
domain for urban renewal purposes, and its plaintiff was the owner
272

D. Benjamin Barros, Home as a Legal Concept, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
255, 255 (2006).
273
Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957,
1013 (1982).
274
United States v. Craighead, 539 F.3d 1073, 1077 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Under
the First Amendment, the ‘State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in
house, what books he may read or what films he may watch.’ The Second Amendment prohibits a federal ‘ban on handgun possession in the home.’ The Third
Amendment forbids quartering soldiers ‘in any house’ in time of peace ‘without
the consent of the Owner.’ The Fourth Amendment protects us against unreasonable searches or seizures in our ‘persons, houses, papers, and effects.’”) (internal
citations omitted).
275
See Michael C. Dorf, Does Heller Protect a Right to Carry Guns Outside
the Home?, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 225, 232 (2008); see also Darrell A.H. Miller,
Guns as Smut: Defending the Home-Bound Second Amendment, COLUM. L. REV.
1278, 1305 (2009).
276
See Somin, Limits of Backlash, supra note 32, at 2108–10.
277
See Barros, supra note 272, at 296–97.
278
Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 231–33 (1984).
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of a department store for commercial purposes and not to be “used
as a dwelling or place of habitation.”279 Indeed, a primary consideration in Berman was whether the commercial property owners subject to condemnation would be permitted to repurchase the land for
redevelopment in “harmony with the overall plan.”280 In other
words, a taking of commercial property with the potential for further
private development at a later date was a primary contention in Berman, not the taking of a single-parcel home.281 While public use
challenges in state courts did sometimes involve nonhomeowner
plaintiffs,282 the distinction in commercial development and homeowner property rights is important here.
Homeowners’ ability to enjoy and preserve their personal interests and financial investments in the home and hearth drive a strong
desire to maintain possession.283 As Jan Cohn notes, “for the vast
majority of Americans, house and home coexist; home flourishes
most successfully in the privately owned, detached, single-family
dwelling.”284 And as Bethany Berger notes, “[a]ll of the plaintiffs
[in Kelo] shared some characteristics that made them especially easy
to sell to the media and public . . . [and] tailor-made to appeal to a
wide swath of Americans.”285 They were white homeowners of single-family detached buildings and thus looked like a bastion of “suburban and rural voters.”286 It is here that the distinction between
homeowners and developers is a persuasive argument for why states
embarked on divergence from federal public use doctrine, yet remain wedded to federal regulatory takings doctrine.

279

Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 31 (1954).
Id. at 34.
281
Id.
282
See, e.g., Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 433–34 (Cal. 1996)
(providing an example of a pre-Kelo state court public use challenge involving a
commercial plaintiff).
283
Barros, supra note 272, at 297.
284
JAN COHN, THE PALACE OR THE POORHOUSE: THE AMERICAN HOME AS A
CULTURAL SYMBOL 223 (1979).
285
Berger, supra note 253, at 1435. Berger contrasts the Kelo picture with that
of the recent New Orleans razing of an African American neighborhood where
holdouts far exceeded those in Kelo, yet the city used eminent domain to acquire
forty-two percent of the properties. Id.
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Id.
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While developers are in a position to “diversify their investment[s]” and are “repeat players” in many jurisdictions, homeowners simply are not.287 For developers, the primary risk of overly burdensome regulations is reduction in land value.288 Such consequences are important for overall business and investment across a
potentially large swath of land within a jurisdiction.289 The extent of
a developer’s fungible property holdings will probably determine
whether burdensome regulations actually do impact its bottom
line.290 However, the primary risk to homeowners is concentrated
on a single parcel of land. As Krier and Sterk note, this makes “diversification” in investments more difficult.291 As Krier and Sterk’s
research shows, homeowners are much more likely to prevail on takings claims than developers are in state-level regulatory (or implicit)
takings challenges.292
It might simply be that state courts are less sympathetic to developers in regulatory takings challenges because of their relationship to the underlying property.293 Another explanation is that state
courts may be more sympathetic to homeowners than developers.294
Developers, who are ordinarily repeat players in the land use and
development processes in a particular jurisdiction, probably litigate
more often (and thus are prone to lose more often) than homeowners, landlords, or even small business owners.295
287

See Krier and Sterk, supra note 8, at 75–76.
Id.
289
Id.
290
Id.
291
Id. at 76.
292
Id. at 76. Krier and Sterk include business owners and landlords with
homeowners. Id.
Developers add value to land by obtaining regulatory approvals.
Their business model is based on the risks and delays inherent
in the approval process. Because they are repeat players in the
development business, they are in a position to diversify their
investment risk over many different development projects. By
contrast, the investment of homeowners, business owners, and
landlords is more likely to be concentrated in a single parcel of
land, making diversification more difficult.
Id. at 75–76.
293
Id. at 76.
294
Id.
295
Id.
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The plaintiffs in almost every major regulatory takings case before the Supreme Court were hardly the quintessential holders of
core property rights. In fact, the rights the landowners were advancing were broad and diverse, yet atypical of societal collective conceptions of core property rights. The plaintiff in Penn Central was
the Penn Central Transportation Company, which owned Grand
Central Terminal, a designated landmark protected by a New York
preservation law.296 Anthony Palazzolo, landowner of beachfront
property, was denied a permit to develop wetlands, and subsequently lost his challenge under a Lucas analysis.297 Yet, his development plans were for no ordinary development, and certainly not
one involving a homeowner. His plans included permits necessary
to create a private beach club that would include, among other
things, parking, picnic areas, and barbecue pits.298 Jean Loretto was
a residential landlord located in the Upper West Side of Manhattan.299 She challenged a statute barring landlords from interfering
with the installation of cable television facilities.300 This was hardly
an earth-shattering result that would irk the typical homeowner’s
conception of private property. David Lucas—owner of two vacant
oceanfront lots on the Isle of Palms in South Carolina—was also not
the typical landowner who would be outraged even if the Supreme

296
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 115–16 (1978).
I leave out the cases Nollan and Dolan since they can be distinguished as exaction
cases. Yet, those plaintiffs would also be distinguishable from the single-parcel
traditional homeowner like Ms. Kelo. The plaintiff in Dolan was a landowner who
applied for, and was denied, a permit to tear down an existing retail building to
construct a larger one in an effort to increase and intensify the commercial use.
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 379, 394–96 (1994). The landowners in
Nollan sought to develop their beachfront lot. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n,
483 U.S. 825, 827–28 (1987). The administrative agency decided to deny the permit unless the Nollans allowed people to cross back and forth across the property.
Id. at 828. This is, again, not a typical story of the average American homeowner.
297
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 613–16, 626–30 (2001) (holding
title acquisition after effective date of regulation did not preclude regulatory takings claim).
298
Id. at 615.
299
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 485 U.S. 419, 421
(1982).
300
Id. at 419–24, 441.
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Court had upheld the government regulation outright instead of remanding back to state court.301 Further, Lucas’s land was undeveloped, and he had yet to build or invest in a single-family home.302
Had the regulation at issue precluded further construction of existing
single-family homes, then perhaps states, regardless of the Court’s
decision to remand, would have been urged to protest the decision
and diverge from the Lucas test set forth by Justice Scalia.
Lingle’s plaintiff was an oil company challenging a statute limiting rent charged to dealers leasing company-owned service stations.303 The plaintiffs in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v.
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency were 400 landowners who were
threatened by a moratorium on their undeveloped land, not their
physical homes. 304 The landowners lived in one of the nation’s most
beautiful, scenic, and touristy freshwater lakes in the United
States.305 At best, the plaintiffs in Tahoe Regional Planning Agency
come closest to the type of plaintiff that might have triggered a major
state-level resistance movement. There were, however, enough differences between these plaintiffs and Ms. Kelo to make Ms. Kelo
appear more vulnerable to a physical appropriation when subjected
to regulations on her property than the hundreds of wealthy individuals who owned undeveloped land near Lake Tahoe. These plaintiff
landowners’ interests in the land were in some ways distinct from
typical homeowners.
The Court’s most recent ruling in Murr v. Wisconsin was in favor of the government.306 Its narrative probably competes with Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, but it still falls short of the kind of
ruling that invokes widespread disapproval across the electorate.
The challengers in Murr were landowners whose use of two lots was
intertwined in the “parcel as a whole” dispute under a Wisconsin
county regulation.307 Although the property in dispute was not a single-parcel home, a small family cabin was situated on one of the
lots, and strong familial ties to the lots were central to the use and
301
302
303
304
305
306
307

Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1008–09, 1031–32 (1992).
Id. at 1008.
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 533 (2005).
535 U.S. 302, 312 (2002).
Id. at 307.
137 S.Ct. 1933, 1950 (2017).
Id. at 1936, 1949.
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conveyance of the lots.308 Still, even the Murr narrative lacked the
political bite and core property rights element that Kelo presented.
Perhaps it is too soon to tell what impact the local government’s
victory will have on state actors’ accord with the Court’s doctrine.309
To understand the importance of these property distinctions, it is
useful to note the events that led to the property rights movement in
the 1990s targeting, among other things, regulatory takings. The
movement targeted perceived government overreach in the regulatory arena, specifically environmental regulation.310 This was in response to major federal legislation in the 1970s, such as the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act and the National Environmental Policy Act, which arguably limited the rights of landowners
in ways unfavorable for property rights advocates.311 While federal
efforts to rein in environmental regulations that purportedly went
too far were unsuccessful, state legislators were aggressive in their
pursuit of stricter private property protections from regulation.312
The property rights movement was largely due to a perception that
environmental regulations underprotected small landowners.313
Critics of the movement saw the legislative efforts as an “attack on
[the] nation’s environmental laws.”314
308

Id. at 1940.
It is worth noting that the reaction to Murr so far has been less extensive
than that to Kelo, and more split along ideological lines. Compare Ilya Somin, A
Loss for Property Rights in Murr v. Wisconsin [Updated with a Link to My Response to Prof. Rick Hills], WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 23, 2017),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/06/23/a-lossfor-property-rights-in-murr-v-wisconsin/?utm_term=.9cd6dcc732e0 (presenting
from a libertarian perspective concerns that the decision is likely to create “confusion and uncertainty going forward”) with Josh Patashnik, Less than Meets the
Eye: Murr’s Impact Is Likely Limited, LAW360 (July 3, 2017, 10:29 AM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/940066/less-than-meets-the-eye-murr-s-impactis-likely-limited (“[I]t is doubtful that Murr will actually change the outcome in
many cases.”).
310
Nancie G. Marzulla, State Private Property Rights Initiative As a Response
to “Environmental Takings,” 46 S.C. L. REV. 613, 613–14, 630–33 (1995).
311
Id. at 615–22, 633–34 (explaining the rise of environmental regulations at
the federal, state and local levels, and noting the electoral success of property
rights advocates in races for the federal and state legislatures).
312
Cordes, supra note 195, at 189–90.
313
Marzulla, supra note 310, at 614–15.
314
John A. Humbach, Should Taxpayers Pay People to Obey Environmental
Laws?, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 423, 430 (1995).
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But, there is one common theme that seems to thread these arguments: landownership and the industries that benefit from it—agriculture, farming, ranching, etc.—at the core of the 1990s property
rights movement. A central issue in the movement to strengthen regulatory takings doctrine at the state legislative level was to protect
industries that overwhelmingly benefited from access to potentially
large landholdings to be used for commercial and agricultural development purposes.315 This is in light of the fact that small farmers and
agriculturalists occupy an extremely small space in the modern
economy.316 This is a distinction that warrants attention. It would
seem that the two movements—1990s property rights movement
and 2005 post-Kelo reform—were seeking to achieve the same results, ie. greater property protections; however, the results at the
state levels differed greatly.317 The latter movement expanded property protections to homeowners and explicitly diverged from Supreme Court takings doctrine, while the former movement barely
expanded property protections as states, for the most part, remained
obedient to the federal regulatory takings rubrics.318
Regulatory takings legislation in the 1990s indicated a preference for compensation statutes that protected landowners from land
use regulations and the imposition of federal takings doctrine as a
guide to regulatory disputes at the local and state administrative
level.319 Thus, the movement to redefine and reclaim the regulatory
takings doctrine garnered the most support from states where landownership is most concentrated and where nonresidential land use
is disproportionate to residential.320 Indeed, the movement “had little to do with protecting [homeowners or] individual landowners,”

315
See Eduardo Moisès Peñalver, Is Land Special? The Unjustified Preference
for Landownership in Regulatory Takings Law, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 227, 263–64
(2004).
316
Id. at 259–60.
317
See supra Part II.
318
Id.
319
See id. for a discussion of state conformity in regulatory takings doctrine
and public use doctrine.
320
Charles Geisler, Ownership: An Overview, 58 RURAL SOC. 532, 539–40
(1993); see Peñalver, supra note 315, at 263.
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but instead pushed for legislation that lifted regulations on commercial development.321
The implications for regulations on developers or landowners of
undeveloped land versus homeowners are nuanced but telling. Unlike typical single-parcel homeowners, a developer’s interest in its
commercial property and undeveloped land is more akin to a fungible asset.322 The location of property for most homeowners threatened by condemnation makes the home nonfungible.323 The homeowner is simply less likely to view the asset at the level of fungibility
as a developer, who may have many properties spread widely within
and across jurisdictions and localities. Thus, overly burdensome
land-use regulations that affect several of the developer’s properties
are inconsequential for the most part when compared to the physical
expropriation of a single parcel for a homeowner. The developer is
mobile and portable. She can choose the jurisdictions in which to
develop based on the regulatory apparatus. Some regulations may
seem overly burdensome, but the developer may be content and
willing to absorb some economic loss, so long as substantial portions
of her properties are not equally burdened by regulation. Such mobility and portability are not so easy for homeowners.
In other words, the distinction between Kelo’s taking of singleparcel homes and Penn Central’s regulation of commercial development may solve the mystery of state conformity and state resistance in constitutional property. The factual descriptions of private property at stake in the Supreme Court’s regulatory takings jurisprudence and the reach of the Supreme Court’s decisions, usually
in favor of the challenger-landowner, did not invoke strong threats
to the core protections of the home to a level where state legislatures
or courts felt obliged by political pressure to thwart regulatory takings doctrine as underprotecting private property.324
321
Douglas T. Kendall & Charles P. Lord, The Takings Project: A Critical
Analysis and Assessment of the Progress So Far, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.
509, 529–30 (1998).
322
See generally Barros, supra note 272, at 278; Peñalver, supra note 315, at
253.
323
See Barros, supra note 272, at 278–82 (evaluating the personal interest in
the home).
324
This line of thinking might lead some to support heightened review of nonfungible single-parcel homeowners in both eminent domain and regulatory takings. See id. at 297–98; Radin, supra note 273, at 1006, 1012–13.
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In effect, the property rights movement in the regulatory takings
vein has disproportionately focused on litigating and lobbying for
more protections to commercial developers and owners of undeveloped land.325 As Eduardo Peñalver argues, “it is unsurprising, then,
that homeowners have not been the forefront of a property-rights
movement focused on the protection of land.”326 In Lucas, the Court
carved out an exception to the regulatory takings test,327 thus setting
forth an implied preference for regulatory takings doctrine that
serves to mostly protect developers as landowners. Molly McUsic
also notes that the regulatory takings doctrine greatly favors the notion of protecting land as opposed to other forms of property.328 Arguably, this view extends to favoring land, whether developed or
undeveloped, over traditional homes. Peter Byrne notes that assets
other than land receive far less attention and interest under the
Court’s regulatory takings doctrine.329 This does not mean that personal property or the typical homeowner cannot benefit from regulatory takings protections. The problem is that the Court’s regulatory
takings doctrine focuses on regulations burdening land and thus
landowners that bring claims “stand a greater chance of prevailing
in the Supreme Court” than homeowners.330 And that seems to have
played out consistently in the “vast majority” of regulatory takings
cases before the Court,331 whereas regulations affecting homeowners and residential uses seem neglected.
325

Peñalver, supra note 315, at 264.
Id. at 263. As Peñalver points out, the American mythology surrounding
homeownership offers little support for the Supreme Court’s creation of, say, a
Lucas categorical rule in land in regulatory takings jurisprudence. Id. at 263 n.196;
see ALFRED M. OLIVETTI, JR. & JEFF WORSHAM, THIS LAND IS YOUR LAND, THIS
LAND IS MY LAND: THE PROPERTY RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND REGULATORY TAKINGS 38–44 (2003).
327
See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029–30 (1992).
328
Molly S. McUsic, The Ghost of Lochner: Modern Takings Doctrine and
Its Impact on Economic Legislation, 76 B.U. L. REV. 605, 647, 653 (1996).
329
J. Peter Byrne, Ten Arguments for the Abolition of the Regulatory Takings
Doctrine, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 89, 90, 127 (1995).
330
Peñalver, supra note 315, at 231 (referencing Supreme Court cases dealing
with regulatory challenges to landowner-developers instead of personal property).
331
See id. at 231 n.20 (“Indeed, the vast majority of regulatory takings cases
in which plaintiffs have prevailed in the Supreme Court have involved suits by
landowners.”).
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Indeed, we find that nonresidential and nonhomeownership uses
of land have dominated the regulatory takings vein of the property
rights movement.332 In fact, support for the property rights movement is strongest in states that have a concentration of landownership for nonresidential, mostly commercial purposes.333 This focus
of the property rights movement “had little to do with protecting individual landowners,” and instead was about deregulating commercial land use to benefit developers.334 The regulatory takings vein of
the property rights movement, in other words, seems to have pursued the practical objectives of stalling land use regulations so that
beneficiaries of the movement, many of whom are commercial developers—not residential homeowners—can freely and profitably
exploit the land.335
As a result of this dichotomy in takings, it is arguably the case
that states may not engage in a countervailing resistance movement
against federal regulatory takings doctrine without a seismic ruling
by the Supreme Court that upholds a regulation that underprotects a
challenger-homeowner. A lack of homeowner litigants in regulatory
takings cases at the Supreme Court may be the root of the conformity in regulatory takings jurisprudence and lack of divergence at the
state level.
III. CONCEPTUAL AND DOCTRINAL EXPLANATIONS
Having established core property rights, such as homeownership, as the origin of the constitutional schism between state convergence in regulatory takings and state divergence in public use doctrine post-Kelo, it is important to acknowledge reasons why states,
prior to Kelo, followed the Supreme Court’s doctrinal script. Further, it is equally important to address alternative explanations, beyond the political economy, for why states abruptly departed from
the Court’s longstanding economic development justification for
public use.
332

See Geisler, supra note 320, at 539–40; Kendall & Lord, supra note 321,
at 529–30; Peñalver, supra note 315, at 231.
333
Peñalver, supra note 315, at 263–64 n.201.
334
Kendall & Lord, supra note 321, at 529.
335
See OLIVETTI & WORSHAM, supra note 326, 37–38 (describing that the
property rights movement allowed industrial lobbyists to channel public frustration with governmental regulation for their own commercial benefit).
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This Part offers some additional explanations for convergence
and divergence, before contending in Part IV that divergence
amongst the states and, at times, with Supreme Court takings doctrine, is healthy for constitutional property in a federalist regime.
A. Convergence Account
On the whole, state courts tend to follow the Court’s public use
interpretive methodologies, tests, and analytical framework as they
do for regulatory takings, with the exception of the post-Kelo phenomenon previously discussed. Why toe the vertical line, so to
speak? In nonpreemptive areas of constitutional law, states are not
coerced or forced to follow the Supreme Court’s doctrinal rubrics
and analytical frameworks, so long as they do not underprotect individual rights below the constitutional baseline. That leaves states
significant discretion to embark on a new doctrinal and analytical
path if they so choose.
A passage from the Tennessee Supreme Court’s ruling on a regulatory takings claim in Phillips v. Montgomery County offers a few
clues in explaining the general compliance with takings doctrine and
lack of divergence at the state level.336 There, the landowner brought
a regulatory takings claim after the county denied his subdivision
plat application.337 The court, having previously recognized only
physical occupation takings and nuisance-like takings, expressly
acknowledged, for the first time, the existence of a regulatory takings claim under the Tennessee Constitution.338 Importantly, the
court noted that the federal Takings Clause encompasses regulatory
takings to the same extent as the Tennessee constitution, and “[t]o
hold otherwise would needlessly complicate an already complex
area of law, increase uncertainty for litigants attempting to bring
claims under both the federal and state constitutions and place Tennessee at odds with the vast majority of states, nearly all of which
have already adopted federal takings jurisprudence.”339 The court
stated that the “textual and historical differences” in the state and

336
337
338
339

442 S.W.3d 233 (Tenn. 2014).
Id. at 236.
Id. at 243.
Id. at 244 (emphasis added).
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federal constitutions are insufficient to depart.340 This passage offers
a foundation upon which we can explore some of the explanations
and implications for the gravitational force of the federal takings
doctrine on state convergence.
1. SIMPLICITY
To interpret the federal Takings Clause and its associated doctrine differently from other states, as the Tennessee Supreme Court
found, would “needlessly complicate an already complex area of
law.”341 It may be the case that state courts will follow the Supreme
Court’s takings jurisprudence “as a matter of agreement and judgment” to simplify the exercise of reviewing a complex area of property law.342 This makes sense to some extent. Takings doctrine is
complicated and muddled.343 It is perhaps easier to simply concede
that the Court got the doctrine right and for state courts to try to work
their way through the muddle by applying the Court’s tests as
closely as possible, rather than straining for a different, arguably
more complicated (or feasible), state-level alternative.344 Or, as
some might argue, the current doctrine is the best we have, so make
the most of it.345
Take the Texas Supreme Court as an example. In Hallco Texas,
Inc. v. McMullen County, the court was inclined to read the federal
and state takings clauses as “comparable” and that it was appropriate
to look to federal doctrine for guidance in regulatory takings analysis.346 The Montana Supreme Court, likewise, found comfort in the
federal script, stating “we have generally looked to federal case law
for guidance when considering takings claims brought under [the
state constitution]—a practice that is consistent with that of other
states with similar or identical language in their state constitutions.”347 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has said that the U.S.
340
Id. at 243 (emphasis added) (stating that it “will not interpret a state constitutional provision differently than a similar federal constitutional provision unless there are sufficient textual or historical differences”).
341
Id. at 244.
342
Dodson, supra note 1, at 729.
343
Phillips, 442 S.W.3d at 244.
344
See Dodson, supra note 1, at 729–30.
345
Id.
346
221 S.W.3d 50, 56 (Tex. 2007).
347
Buhmann v. State, 201 P.3d 70, 85 (Mont. 2008).
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Supreme Court’s reasoning in Palazzolo348 meant that “[a] similar
result should follow” in a similar case.349 The Minnesota Supreme
Court has noted “that the standards set forth in Penn Central provide
the best analytic framework to determine whether the city’s actions
resulted in a regulatory taking under the Minnesota Constitution.”350
In some ways, the simplification of following federal takings
doctrine presumes federal doctrine is valid. In other words, states
may simply believe there is a presumption of validity when the Supreme Court hands down its newest rendition of confusing rules and
elements in takings cases.351 Because state actors may simply think
the Supreme Court tends to get the takings question right, it would
seem that conformity provides the path of least resistance.352 It may
just be a little easier to agree “because federal law says so.”353
2. AVOIDANCE
Simplicity may also just mean “avoidance.” It may be the case
that state courts actively avoid the tough and complex methodological and analytical questions of federal takings doctrine. It is, perhaps, just “cognitively easier and simpler” for state courts to avoid
the big doctrinal questions in a way that would depart from
longstanding federal doctrine.354 The problem, of course, is that
avoiding complications in the law and instead just following federal
law risks state courts legitimacy, making them look like “simpleminded dependents of their smarter older sibling.”355 In other words,
might it be the case that state courts truly are intellectually inferior
to federal courts, especially the Supreme Court, and that the intellectual heavyweights just seem to get the hard questions right?

348
349

Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
Machipongo Land & Coal Co. v. Commonwealth, 799 A.2d 751, 762 (Pa.

2002).
350

Wensmann Realty, Inc. v. City of Eagan, 734 N.W.2d 623, 633 (Minn.

2007).
351
352
353
354
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Dodson, supra note 1, at 731.
Id. at 729–30.
Id. at 729.
Id. at 730.
Id. at 748.
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3. CLARITY AND CERTAINTY
Like simplicity and avoidance, albeit slightly different, are the
values of clarity and certainty. As the Phillips court noted, diverging
from federal doctrine would “increase uncertainty for litigants attempting to bring claims under both the federal and state constitutions.”356 One explanation for complicity in federal takings doctrine
may be that doing so is a service to landowners—and their lawyers—litigating the issues. Many lawyers use federal law as a framework “rather than state law in order to take advantage of the national
application of federal law.”357 Indeed, federal constitutional arguments may cover more ground amongst the states than solely applying state law.358 Take, for example, the Court’s Berman decision in
1954,359 which has received extensive citations and references
where matters of public use were at issue.360 Logically, then, state
judges may have simply become so accustomed to state lawyers’
reliance on federal takings doctrine over time that state courts prefer
to continue such practices so litigants have certainty. State court
lawyers, in some ways, are just as “steeped” in the federal doctrine
as lawyers who litigate in federal court, and will tend to raise and
address state issues—almost unconsciously—in federal terms.361
Litigants may find it far more efficient and effective to argue the
federal angle as opposed to the state angle.362 State courts, then, reciprocate as they become familiar with these federally grounded arguments and tailor their analytical frameworks based largely on federal doctrine.363
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Phillips v. Montgomery County, 442 S.W.3d 233, 244 (Tenn. 2014).
Dodson, supra note 1, at 737.
358
See WILLIAMS, supra note 85, at 194–95.
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Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
360
See supra Part II and accompanying text.
361
See Dodson, supra note 1, at 737–38 (“Any state law issues that arise enter
a conversation so steeped in federal terms that lawyers and jurists tend to raise
and address those state issues in federal terms.”); see also Robert F. Williams, In
the Supreme Court’s Shadow: Legitimacy of State Rejection of Supreme Court
Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C. L. REV. 353, 403 (1984) [hereinafter Williams,
Supreme Court’s Shadow] (noting the dominance of Supreme Court decisions in
thinking about constitutional law).
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See Dodson, supra note 1, at 737–38.
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See id.; Williams, Supreme Court’s Shadow, supra note 361, at 403.
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The dominance of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in other
areas of constitutional law has caused questions of state constitutional law “to be filtered almost exclusively through the federal constitutional law perspective.”364 This may be due to a preference for
clarity and certainty in litigation. Who really wants to travel off the
beaten path onto a road less travelled when the stakes are so high in
litigation, particularly in an area as confusing and muddled as regulatory takings? As for the public use doctrine, it makes sense, in
some respects, that a major ruling like Berman that espoused judicial
deference to legislative determinations on issues so local as condemnation would influence state courts to follow the Court’s lead in interpreting takings challenges under the auspice of the Court’s public
use doctrine. It also seems relevant that state court opinions that do
diverge from the Supreme Court tend to contain thorough explanations for doing so, while state court decisions that simply follow federal doctrine may not engage in an extensive discussion of their reasoning at all.365
Federal public use doctrine, unlike regulatory takings, provides
a manageable and digestible framework that can be applied equally
and, arguably, without rivalry among state courts.366 For the states,
it is sensible and economical to lead with Berman as the baseline
and piggyback off the broad public use conception because this approach lessens the resource burdens necessary to blaze a different
path.367 This strategy bears out in other areas of federal law. Take,
for example, civil procedure and the longstanding litigation strategies of removing state claims to federal court, or plaintiffs who file
state-federal cases in federal court.368 The result is that, often times,
important state-related questions are formulated and presented as
federal questions by lawyers, which may leave a vacuum of underdeveloped state law to be filled at a later date.369
364

Williams, Supreme Court’s Shadow, supra note 361, at 403.
See Dodson, supra note 1, at 711 (noting that a typical state court “tends to
treat a federal appellate opinion as presumptively controlling, or at least as highly
persuasive authority, without regard to any state policy reason for adherence or
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See id. at 730.
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4. TEXTUAL AND HISTORICAL DIFFERENCES
As the Phillips Court noted, the “textual and historical differences” in the state and federal constitutions were simply not enough
to seriously decline to follow regulatory takings doctrine.370 Another
possible takeaway, thus, is that a “general lack of historical records
on the events and forces that shaped state constitutions creates problems for [state] judges who wish to develop [new] state law[s]” and
doctrines.371 It is perhaps necessary for state courts to engage in
deeper and more meaningful historical and textual practices to go
beyond the federal minima in takings doctrine.372 This requires, of
course, the willingness of state courts to take the time to research
and engage with the historical context of its state constitution.373
One might argue that “state judges have largely lacked the tools to
develop an independent body of state constitutional law.”374 However, despite the lack of historical records regarding state constitutions, “state constitutional history is . . . much more available than
federal constitutional history.”375 So, why don’t more state courts
engage in the historical and textual distinctions to formulate a different approach to takings doctrine?
The Tennessee court’s ruling in Phillips seemed to imply that
divergence would be acceptable only if the textual and historical
contexts between the state and federal provisions differed.376 But, of
course, this requires state courts to actually engage with those textual and historical differences. The Phillips court did so, noting that
“[t]he wording” of the state and federal takings clauses are “similar”
and “no textual variances” suggest the clauses should be interpreted
370

Phillips v. Montgomery County, 442 S.W.3d 233, 243–44 (emphasis
added) (stating that it “will not interpret a state constitutional provision differently
than a similar federal constitutional provision unless there are sufficient textual or
historical differences”).
371
Michael Esler, State Supreme Court Commitment to State Law, 78 JUDICATURE 25, 31 (1994); see Dodson, supra note 1, at 725 (noting that “states should
exercise independence in state constitutionalism, relying on the preferences of
their particular populaces,” but largely do not).
372
Jason Mazzone, When the Supreme Court Is Not Supreme, 104 NW. U. L.
REV. 979, 1060–62 (2010).
373
See id.
374
Id. at 1061.
375
WILLIAMS, supra note 85, at 319.
376
Phillips v. Montgomery County, 442 S.W.3d 233, 243 (Tenn. 2014).
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differently.377 It is of note, however, that the court in Phillips was
first faced with the question of whether a regulatory takings framework even existed under Tennessee constitutional law.378 So, one
would expect the court to venture into the history of its constitutional text to find meaning.
The Nevada Supreme Court in McCarran International Airport
v. Sisolak also employed a textual and historical interpretive methodology.379 There, the court first acknowledged “states may expand
the individual rights of their citizens under state law beyond those
provided under the Federal Constitution.”380 The court then proceeded to engage in a textual and historical analysis of the Nevada
Constitution’s takings clause, concluding that the drafters of the
document contemplated expansive property rights.381 The dissent
disagreed with the broad statement that the state takings clause intended to give landowners greater protections than the federal Takings Clause, noting that such a statement “contradicts over a century
of precedent” and that the “broad, sweeping holding, without any
reference to Nevada’s constitutional debates or other significant
supporting analysis, is unwise and unwarranted.”382 Nonetheless,
this is not standard interpretive procedure among states analyzing
takings claims. The vast majority of states seem to simply rely upon
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence and apply the doctrine in lockstep.383 Might it be the case that the robust state constitutionalism
and independence envisioned by Justices Brandeis and Brennan will
require state courts to begin to engage in a textual and historical approach to analyzing takings claims?
If, as the proponents of New Federalism insist, independent
analysis of state constitutions should provide the primary tool for
constitutional interpretation, then why have the majority of state
courts and state legislatures preferred to follow the Supreme Court’s

377

Id.
Id. at 243–44.
379
137 P.3d 1110, 1121–23 (Nev. 2006).
380
Id. at 1126 (quoting State v. Bayard, 71 P.3d 498, 502 (2003)).
381
McCarran, 137 P.3d at 1126–27.
382
Id. at 1131 (Becker, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
383
Phillips, 442 S.W.3d at 244. See Section III.B.6 for a discussion of Alabama’s Supreme Court as another example.
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public use jurisprudence?384 Louisiana is a leading state (although
enveloped by its civil code) for those seeking an example of independent analysis of the state constitution.385 In considering an issue
involving the eminent domain provisions of the state constitution in
State Department of Transportation and Development v. Dietrich,386
the Louisiana Supreme Court engaged in an interpretive and analytical methodology that considered “the text of the . . . provision . . . , that provision’s predecessor in the previous constitution,
and some judicial precedent relevant to the construction of the provision.”387 But the ruling makes no mention of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause or the Supreme Court’s eminent domain doctrine.388 As James Gardner notes, the Louisiana Supreme Court
provides some guidance to participants in the legal
system concerning the proper way to talk about the
meaning of the constitution; presumably, a litigant
will be able in a future case to craft an argument, if
one is available, based on the text of a provision of
the current constitution and its counterpart in the previous constitution.389
Additionally, the Indiana Supreme Court held in State v. Kimco
of Evansville, Inc. that condemnation of a shopping center owner’s
property for reconfiguration of a road did not constitute a compensable taking.390 The court noted that the state and federal takings
clauses are “textually indistinguishable and are to be analyzed identically,” allowing the court to harmonize its state takings doctrine
with the federal approach spelled out in Lingle and Penn Central.391
Indeed, where a state court finds no textual differences, it is more
likely to follow the trodden path of the Supreme Court’s doctrine.392
384

See infra Section IV.C for a discussion of New Federalism.
See, e.g., State Dep’t of Transp. & Dev. v. Dietrich, 555 So. 2d 1355, 1358
(La. 1990); Gardner, Failed Discourse, supra note 80, at 799.
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2d at 1358–59).
388
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5. VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL UNIFORMITY
Another explanation for state courts’ reluctance to diverge from
federal doctrine is that such a path would place a state “at odds with
the vast majority of states, nearly all of which have already adopted
federal takings jurisprudence.”393 This raises the concepts of vertical
and horizontal uniformity.394 Vertical uniformity involves state
courts and state legislatures conforming to federal law because it is
either the best approach or it enables “states to claim equal footing
with federal law.”395 Horizontal uniformity, on the other hand, is
when states across the nation uniformly treat, interpret, and apply
the federal law and doctrine the same.396
As Dodson explains, “[a]n obvious rationale for state following
is to reap the benefits of uniformity.”397 In other words, uniform interpretation and application of federal takings doctrine may give the
impression that institutions have legitimacy.398 Horizontal uniformity seemed to be a major consideration for the Phillips court in
determining whether to decline to follow the federal takings doctrine. The court there seemed to confirm its fidelity to horizontal
and vertical uniformity in holding that the state takings clause encompasses regulatory takings to the same extent as the federal provision, and that such an alternative finding would otherwise be at
“odds” with the rest of the nation.399 State courts, like the Tennessee
Supreme Court, may be doing this because it offers predictability
within particular geographic areas.400 This is not hard to imagine
given the local nature of property disputes.
Property disputes involving regulations are inherently local
given the nature of background legal principles that underlie takings
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Phillips v. Montgomery County, 442 S.W.3d 233, 244 (Tenn. 2014).
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Id. at 736.
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Dodson, supra note 1, at 732.
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Id. at 732 (citing Fallon, supra note 363, at 1794–96).
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jurisprudence.401 Uniformity in the complex area of regulatory takings may help mask some of the underlying anxieties of jurists, litigants, and the public that regulations threaten to economically deprive a landowner’s use of property. The Phillips court’s concern of
dissimilarity and disuniformity may also be an effort to provide
“simplicity, clarity, and efficiency by reducing [or avoiding] variation” amongst jurisdictions, as well as amongst state trial and state
appellate courts.402 Recall, Phillips is a state supreme court ruling
setting forth the state’s adherence to the federal regulatory takings
doctrine in the absence of an identifiable state equivalent.403
This may help give the impression that state courts across and
within jurisdictions unanimously agree on the direction in which the
federal takings doctrine is taking them and are applying it consistently.404 Indeed, vertical uniformity may give state courts legitimacy
when applying takings doctrine from the top down, while horizontal
uniformity may give state courts further legitimacy by engaging in
interpretive methodologies that would result in consistent applications of the federal takings doctrine across state jurisdictions.405
Divergence from federal doctrine, in other words, would produce
much “confusion and instability.”406 As the argument goes,
“landowners . . . deserve the same basic protections under wellsettled eminent domain law afforded by other jurisdictions.”407
6. DEMOCRATIC NATURE OF STATE COURTS
Many state court judges are elected, and the Supreme Court or
federal law could easily overturn their decisions.408 Thus, it might

401

See supra Part II.
See Dodson, supra note 1, at 733.
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be better for state judges to be safe and follow federal takings doctrine rather than risk being overturned.409 The risk of nullity or reversal is high.410 Wayne Logan argues that state court judges will
adopt rights-restrictive positions, because such positions are the
“safest.”411 Conforming to the Supreme Court’s takings doctrine
may also result in state courts shifting responsibility of developing
the doctrine to the high court, instead of dabbling with the difficult
analytical questions at the state level.412 State courts pre-Kelo may
have also been aware that high-profile determinations that diverged
from federal law were more likely to be overruled than the rulings
that comported with the federal public use doctrine.413 Post-Berman
decisions that did not depart from the Court’s broad conception may
have been partly a result of “political cover.”414
7. THE URBAN RENEWAL MOVEMENT
Wendell Pritchett has argued that local and state urban elites
helped reimagine the public use doctrine to promote revitalization
efforts in the inner cities.415 Local governments sought greater redevelopment of the urban core in the early 1900s.416 This was done, in
part, to protect the business interests of the real estate industry, progressive reformers, urban planners, and politicians.417 Thus, stakeholders and interest groups had to concoct a feasible legal interpretation of public use that would persuade both state and federal courts
to conform to a broad conception of public use.418 This broad conception meant taking private property, oftentimes located in “slums”
and “blighted areas,” and transferring it to private interests in the
409

Id.
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411
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name of a public benefit—the removal of slums which were health
and safety hazards.419
This provides a plausible explanation for why state courts—
pressured by local and state political interests in light of the Berman
decision—were reluctant to divert from the broad conception of
public use to pursue condemnations for urban renewal purposes.420
Indeed, urban renewal reshaped the American urban landscape in
ways that may not have been possible without state courts complying with a broad conception of public use.421 These relatively innocuous external forces and the lobbying efforts to reimagine the public
use clause yield strong arguments for the conformity at the state
level. Indeed, once the Supreme Court weighed in on the issue of
the exercise of eminent domain to clear slums, one might have expected state courts to conform to the broad conception because state
court judges are oftentimes politically accountable for decisions as
a result of judicial elections.422 Combine this accountability with the
rapid transformations of the urban core due to urban renewal in
many American cities, and it becomes clear that state following of
federal doctrine was essential for reasons perhaps beyond mere doctrinal conformity with federal law and uniformity amongst the
states. The health and well-being of urban centers was at stake.
The success of developing a broad public use jurisprudence for
urban renewal in state courts depended upon a comprehensive effort
of local real estate and housing advocates, which included lobbying
in state legislatures, litigating claims in state trial courts, and submitting amicus briefs.423 The urban revitalization movement may
have made state court following of the broad conception of public
use all the more necessary.
8. CUSTOM
The Supreme Court’s expansion of federal rights under the Supremacy Clause has curtailed state independence in developing their
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own jurisprudence on a number of substantive issues.424 The Berman decision, however, did not invoke the Supremacy Clause and
mandate that states must follow the decision; instead, the substance
of the opinion clearly implied great deference to state and local legislative determinations regarding eminent domain.425 A push for
greater state independence,426 nonetheless, saw state courts develop
a habit in the public use provision that ballooned into widespread
conformity. In other words, over time, the Berman ruling cast a
“long shadow”427 over state courts and was “extremely influential
upon state courts,”428 which invariably became custom throughout
the decades following the decision. The longer states exercised less
independence from a major Supreme Court ruling, the easier it became to ride the doctrine overtime as a judicial and legislative custom.429 Takings doctrine, especially public use, became a staple and
solid foundation for state courts to use in condemnation challenges.
All this being said, the link in the chain of conformity in takings
doctrine came loose in the 2005 Kelo decision, causing an abrupt
resistance to the Court’s public use doctrine.430 As I have argued,
the most persuasive explanation is the political economy; that is,
state actors and the electorate perceived the Court’s Kelo ruling as
an attack on the sanctity of the home.431 But, are there additional
explanations for general divergence? Indeed, there are.
424
See Brennan, State Constitutions, supra note 58, at 495 (noting that it was
only natural that the federalization of rights by the federal courts caused state
courts to have “no reason to consider what protections, if any, were secured by
state constitutions”); see also Mazzone, supra note 372, at 1061 (“[A] legacy of
the historical trends . . . has turned state judges into expert and busy administrators
of the Federal Constitution . . . .”).
425
See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (explaining that states have
the authority to legislate concerning local affairs).
426
William Brennan, The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State
Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U L. REV. 535, 548
(1986).
427
See Dodson, supra note 1, at 729 (discussing “long shadow” of Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)).
428
Pritchett, supra note 158, at 2 n.6.
429
See, e.g., Phillips v. Montgomery County, 442 S.W.3d 233, 243–44 (Tenn.
2014).
430
See supra Section II.B.1.
431
See supra Section II.B.4.
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B. Divergence Account
Why did Kelo spark a counter-gravitational reaction that upended decades of convergence with federal public use, and specifically, the economic development branch of Takings Clause doctrine? What was so different about Kelo and why has the regulatory
takings vein not experienced a gravitational resistance at the state
level? After the Kelo ruling, the majority of states concluded that the
Supreme Court got it wrong; that economic development justifications for eminent domain underprotected property owners.432 Such
widespread resistance was followed by a string of state supreme
court rulings and state constitutional amendments banning or limiting economic development takings, effectively announcing wide
state resistance to federal takings law.433 And what about those rare
episodes of divergence in regulatory takings at the state level amidst
widespread conformity for decades post-Mahon? What empowered
those state supreme courts to be willing and able to depart?
Indeed, we arrived at this unusual episode of post-Kelo divergence in this Article in light of many state courts’ tepidness to depart
from the doctrines set forth in Berman and Mahon, while many state
legislatures crafted eminent domain laws to stay within the ambit of
the Court’s doctrine.434 Prior to Kelo, there were few instances
where states specifically granted greater protections to private property beyond the “constitutional bottom”435 constructed by the Supreme Court and contemplated in the Takings Clause.436 Here, we
embark on additional “explanatory vector[s]”437 for why Kelo
caused a rupture in conformity in public use doctrine at the state
level.

432

See supra Section II.B.1.
Somin, Limits of Backlash, supra note 32, at 2102–03.
434
See supra Section II.B.3.
435
John Ferejohn & Barry Friedman, Toward a Political Theory of Constitutional Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 825, 853 (2006) (noting that Supreme
Court prescriptions create a “constitutional bottom” that leaves room for more
“rights-protective action” by the states).
436
See supra Part II.
437
Dodson, supra note 1, at 729.
433
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1. INFLUENTIAL COUNTERVAILING WAVES
In Board of County Commissioners of Muskogee County v. Lowery, the Oklahoma Supreme Court noted that it was guided by the
state and federal constitutional takings clauses, especially the state
takings clause regarding condemnation.438 The court then engaged
in a brief historical and textual account.439 Relying upon Justice Stevens’s nod to federalism, the court accepted his invitation440 to depart from federal doctrine by relying upon its “own special constitutional eminent domain provision,” which provides more protections above the federal baseline and has a more narrow interpretation
of public use and public purpose than the Supreme Court.441 Noteworthy, however, is the court’s acknowledgment that it was joining
“other jurisdictions” who reached similar state decisions on state
constitutional grounds, including state legislative action.442
While the court offered a variety of explanations for departing,
such as avoiding the possibility that economic development takings
would “blur the line between ‘public’ and ‘private’” or that the state
constitution should remain “what [its] framers” intended,443 might
the departure really be that a countervailing force opposite of convergence was simply too strong (or too irresistible) to pass up?
While some state courts in other constitutional contexts “erect doctrinal barriers” to ensure they follow federal doctrine,444 it is possible that state courts post-Kelo were constructing similar doctrinal
hurdles that precluded them from following the Court’s broad conception of public use. The Lowery court’s opinion in many ways
tracks what state courts post-Berman were doing; that is, go with the
broad public use interpretation “unless some countervailing force
enables resistance.”445 Indeed, the Kelo decision, and the negative
438

Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Muskogee Cnty. v. Lowery, 136 P.3d 639, 645
(Okla. 2006).
439
Id. at 645–47.
440
See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489 (2005) (“We emphasize that nothing in our opinion precludes any State from placing further restrictions on its exercise of the takings power.”).
441
Lowery, 136 P.3d at 651.
442
Id.
443
Lowery, 136 P.3d at 652.
444
Dodson, supra note 1, at 727.
445
Id.
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reaction from other states, may be the countervailing force that enabled other state supreme courts, like Oklahoma’s, to join the resistance.
2. LEGISLATIVE LOYALTY
State court divergence post-Kelo may simply be an act of legislative fidelity, as most legislatures imposed greater protections, and
state supreme courts simply deferred to the legislatures’ judgment,
even if the state courts agreed with the Supreme Court’s broad interpretation. The Supreme Court of Missouri, shortly after Kelo,
ruled in favor of a landowner’s challenge to eminent domain, finding an economic development taking invalid.446 But, in doing so, the
court noted that it “sees no reason at this point to deviate from the
holding of [Kelo] with regard to the constitutional validity of takings
for the purpose of economic development,” yet the court proceeded
to invalidate the economic development taking under its state eminent domain law.447 It seems odd, but legitimate, for a state court,
amidst a wave of resistance nationwide, to proclaim that “[e]conomic development ‘unquestionably serves a public purpose,’” but
as a matter of “public policy . . . economic development may not be
the sole purpose of a taking.”448 As the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania noted in Reading Area Water Authority v. Schuykill River
Greenway Ass’n, the federal public use clause was immaterial to its
determination and “we need not decide the constitutional issue because, even if we assume the [economic development taking] can
pass Fifth Amendment scrutiny, to be valid it must also be statutorily
permissible.”449 Indeed, legislative loyalty is a persuasive explanation for deviation from Kelo, even if some state supreme courts expressly agreed with the Court’s ruling.

446

State ex rel. Jackson v. Dolan, 398 S.W.3d 472, 482 (Mo. 2013).
Id. at 478.
448
Id. at 482. (quoting Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 484 (2005).
449
100 A.3d 572, 582 (Pa. 2014). The court continued “[i]n this regard, it may
be observed that, in the wake of Kelo, the General Assembly enacted PRPA [the
Property Rights Protection Act], which contains a salient, affirmative prohibition
on the taking of private property ‘in order to use it for private enterprise.’” Id.
(quoting 26 PA. CONS. STAT. § 204(a)).
447
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3. INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE
Resistance to the federal public use doctrine may have been
linked to the idea that state actors—especially municipalities and
state administrative agencies—have superior knowledge and expertise in weighing competing uses of land, and that state legislatures
were responding to this localist approach to eminent domain by enacting statutes.450 The same year that Kelo was decided, the Court
handed down its decision applying preclusion rules to takings in San
Remo Hotel v. City & County of San Francisco.451 The Court made
an interesting through-line in its opinion, stating similarly to Justice
Stevens’s nod to federalism in Kelo,452 that “state courts undoubtedly have more experience than federal courts do in resolving the
complex factual, technical, and legal questions related to zoning and
land-use regulations.”453
This superior institutional competence may be a reason why
state actors, or non-federal actors, are best positioned to address
property rights issues.454 Why? Because of state actors’ intimate institutional knowledge of the land and property rights at the local
level.455 The resistance to federal public use doctrine may have been
a message from the states that property and land use disputes arising
from overly broad definitions of public use are an area in which the
states should take the lead.456 Roderick “Rick” Hills notes that Kelo
450
Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Individual Right to Federalism in the Rehnquist
Court, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 888, 891–92 (2006) (discussing superior institutional competence of state governments).
451
545 U.S. 323, 344–45 (2005).
452
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 482.
453
Sam Remo Hotel, 545 U.S. at 347.
454
Cf. Dodson, supra note 1, at 750–51.
455
See Hills, supra note 450, at 892.
456
See San Remo Hotel, 545 U.S. at 347; Hills, supra note 450, at 891–92
(interpreting and defending Kelo and other recent Supreme Court property rights
decisions as examples of deference to federalism and emphasizing superior institutional competence of state governments); see also The Kelo Decision: Investigating Takings of Homes and Other Private Property: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 16 (2005) [hereinafter Merrill Testimony]
(statement of Thomas W. Merrill, Charles Keller Beekman Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law) (emphasizing that “property rights have different circumstances around the country” and “[s]tate variation and experimentation
should to be allowed to flourish”).
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“can fairly be characterized as favoring federalism by giving nonfederal officials substantial discretion to define constitutional rights
that protect private property” because it allows nonfederal actors to
determine “what constitutes a public use.”457 And, as Sterk notes,
because state law determines the content of property rights, state
courts and state legislatures—and by extension local administrative
agencies and city councils—may have an advantage over federal entities in land use knowledge and expertise.458 However, state actors
are “insulated from many of the pressures that face local regulators
and are consequently in a position to police abusive practices” better
than local or federal actors, especially federal courts.459
Although eminent domain law itself does not necessarily implicate land use, the exercise of the power of eminent domain is often
part and parcel of, and has implications for, land use.460 Thus, the
countervailing resistance to the public use doctrine by the states may
be the result of the states’ discomfort with federal actors determining
state and local matters where expertise is lacking. Perhaps state actors feel that such interpretations do not fit neatly into the local comprehensive planning schemes over which state administrative agencies, municipalities, and even trial courts have more institutional
knowledge and power.
4. RESISTANCE TO VERTICAL UNIFORMITY
One popular belief is that states are lured into the orbit of federal
law because “federal law gets the law right first, and state actors,
realizing this, follow as a matter of agreement and judgment.”461 Before the sweeping post-Kelo refutation of the Supreme Court’s public use doctrine, states seemed to follow the Court’s precedent “because federal law says so.”462 Perhaps it was easier to simply follow
457

See Hills, supra note 450, at 892 (internal quotations omitted).
See Sterk, supra note 21, at 264.
459
Id. at 206.
460
For an account on the early history of the use of eminent domain as a central instrument of land use policy, see ROBERT C. ELLICKSON ET AL., LAND USE
CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS 901 (4th ed. 2013); Tony Freyer, Reassessing
the Impact of Eminent Domain in Early American Economic Development, 1981
WIS. L. REV. 1263.
461
See Dodson, supra note 1, at 729.
462
Id.; see also supra Part II for a discussion of state conformity to federal
takings doctrine.
458
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lockstep rather than “blaze a new trail.”463 But, it may also be the
case that states post-Kelo learned to value horizontal uniformity
over vertical uniformity.464
The potential problem with vertical uniformity, as the states
post-Kelo may have been implicitly saying, is that “[i]f each state
pursues intrastate uniformity by following federal law, then state
law will mimic federal law in all states, stagnating [the arguably preferred] experimentation and evolution at both the intra- and interstate levels.”465 This variation in the law at the state level arguably
makes vertical uniformity with federal law less appealing because
following federal law at the state level “may lead to disconnects between state policies, state law, and state judicial interpretation.”466
This is somewhat persuasive. As Dodson notes, “uncritical state following of noncontrolling federal law lends credence to the position
that states are just not as good at being sovereign as the federal government is.”467 This leads to the perception that states prefer to
“slavishly follow[] . . . federal law without considering state variables degrad[ing] both state law and state courts.”468 That perception
was somewhat eviscerated after the Kelo decision. With less uniformity in the federal public use doctrine and more uniformity
across the states, homeowners, in particular, have a menu of jurisdictions from which to choose for obtaining the greatest protections
463

Dodson, supra note 1, at 730.
See Anthony J. Bellia Jr., State Courts and the Interpretation of Federal
Statutes, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1501, 1553–54 (2006) (arguing that federal law should
be uniformly interpreted across states and federal courts); Erwin Chemerinsky &
Larry Kramer, Defining the Role of the Federal Courts, 1990 BYU L. REV. 67, 95
(1990) (arguing that federal courts should strive for “[u]niformity in the interpretation and application of federal law”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer,
New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV.
1731, 1812–13 n.451 (1991) (“[W]e do have a single federal judicial system in
which uniformity is a prominent aspiration.”). But see generally Amanda Frost,
Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1569–74 (2008) (questioning the
virtues of horizontal federal uniformity).
465
Dodson, supra note 1, at 746.
466
Id. at 746–47.
467
Id. at 748; see also Sanford Levinson, On Positivism and Potted Plants:
“Inferior” Judges and the Task of Constitutional Interpretation, 25 CONN. L.
REV. 843, 845 (1993) (making an analogous point regarding lower federal courts
in relation to the Supreme Court).
468
Dodson, supra note 1, at 751.
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from economic development condemnations.469 In many ways,
states’ preference for horizontal, rather than vertical, uniformity was
a nod to the Rehnquist Court’s delegation of “substantial control
over takings doctrine to the nonfederal governments that are allegedly confined by [the] doctrine.”470
5. COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM
Perhaps the post-Kelo abrupt divergence was due to state interest
in “competitive federalism.”471 Some argue that the post-Kelo resistance was a political and market response to homevoter concerns
of continued abuses of property rights by eminent domain, and that
such political sentiment would result in the loss of business and taxpayers to other jurisdictions that had more protections against eminent domain.472 Ilya Somin rejects this theory in the takings context
because property owners are unlikely to “vote with their feet”
against eminent domain or regulatory exactions or takings.473 He argues that if homevoters move out, they cannot take their land with
them.474 But underlying the concerns of homevoters—those with
469

See Marc Mihaly & Turner Smith, Kelo’s Trail: A Survey of State and Federal Legislative and Judicial Activity Five Years Later, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 703,
707 (2011) (noting that “[a]pproximately forty states have enacted legislation to
limit eminent domain authority since Kelo”).
470
Hills, supra note 450, at 892.
471
Robert C. Ellickson, Federalism and Kelo: A Question for Richard Epstein, 44 TULSA L. REV. 751, 762 (2009).
472
Ilya Somin, Federalism and Property Rights, 2011 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 53,
57 (2011) [hereinafter Somin, Federalism and Property Rights]; see Ellickson,
supra note 471, at 762–63 n.66 (2009) (arguing that states enact protections for
homeowners because they do not want to see their tax bases move away); see also
WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES 3–4 (2001) (“The homevoter hypothesis holds that homeowners, who are the
most numerous and politically influential group within most localities, are guided
by their concern for the value of their homes to make political decisions that are
more efficient than those that would be made at a higher level of government.”);
Vicki Been, “Exit” as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 509 (1991) (“[T]he
community must compete with other jurisdictions if it wants to encourage development because a developer dissatisfied with a community’s . . . policy can take
the project to another jurisdiction that offers better terms.”).
473
Somin, Federalism and Property Rights, supra note 472, at 58.
474
Id.

2018]

FEDERALISM, CONVERGENCE, AND DIVERGENCE

219

strong interests and investments in single-parcel homes—are
longstanding considerations of protections to core property rights.
6. DISHARMONY
Strict following of federal doctrine and the Court’s methodological and analytical frameworks may cause more confusion in interpreting analogous state constitutional provisions.475 For those states
that have chosen to depart (or remain tethered to their textual and
historical tradition), the concern is that unequivocal following may
produce disharmony between two or more provisions covering similar protections within a state constitution.476 Take for example the
Supreme Court of Alabama’s ruling declining to adopt the federal
regulatory takings doctrine under its state constitution.477 There, the
court was faced with two similarly worded provisions under the Alabama state constitution dealing with takings, neither of which the
court found to include an analytical angle for regulatory takings.478
The concurring opinions noted that “[t]o accomplish such an interpretation and apply it in this case . . . the definition of a ‘taking’
in [section] 23 must be expanded to something less than an actual
physical taking.”479 Thus, adherence to the federal rubrics would
have further confused, rather than clarified, state intraconstitutional
text and generated disharmony where such disunity is unnecessary.480 The real concern for courts, like the Supreme Court of Alabama, is the “inequity” that such “trumping” of one provision over
the other would create, “essentially” rendering one state constitutional provision “meaningless” and swallowing other provisions to
merely conform with what is already a confusing doctrine.481 It is
unclear to what extent this sentiment permeates other state courts.
Alabama seems to be a true outlier; nonetheless, it is an explanation
for divergence worth noting.
475

WILLIAMS, supra note 85, at 150–52.
See, e.g., Town of Gurley v. M & N Materials, Inc., 143 So. 3d 1, 50 (Ala.
2012) (Shaw, J., concurring specially).
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Id. at 13 (majority opinion).
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Id. at 12–13.
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Id. at 50 (Shaw, J., concurring specially).
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IV. TOWARDS DIVERGENCE
A. States as Laboratories of Property
The post-Kelo resistance is an example of state experimentation
with constitutional property. The almost universal derision of and
resistance to the Kelo decision at the state level was what Justice
Brandeis might have envisioned when he wrote that “[i]t is one of
the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”482 Of course, post-Kelo, it was not just one single courageous
state, but nearly fifty states that said “no” to the Court’s decision.483
Kelo, in other words, may have exceeded Brandeis’s expectations
that states would engage in a certain level of autonomy and sovereign independence.
As part of American property law, the post-Kelo pushback from
federal public use doctrine may be viewed as an additional example
of “a giant laboratory in which states vie to develop the most efficient property regime.”484 As Merrill notes, property rights are different around the country, and “[s]tate variation and experimentation ought to be allowed to flourish.”485 And, as Sterk has noted in
the regulatory takings context, national conformity is not only impossible, but it is also unhealthy for regulating property at the state
level because state background law differs substantially from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.486 Yet, states have followed the jurisprudence
lockstep.
One way to think about state actors taking a more assertive—or
divergent—role beyond what federal law requires is the discrete
benefits that only states can offer to their citizenry.487 The very es-

482
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
483
See supra Section II.B.
484
Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property and Federalism, 115
YALE L.J. 72, 75 (2005).
485
Merrill Testimony, supra note 456, at 16.
486
Sterk, supra note 21, at 234.
487
See Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States When It Matters: A Different
Approach to Preemption, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1313, 1324–26 (2004) (cataloguing
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sence of federalism is the ability for states—and their municipalities—to implement policy on a gradual basis that fits the local culture.488 Justice Brandeis’s call for innovation at the state level seems
to be an important background theme in the post-Kelo legislative
and judicial backlash. States did not agree with the Supreme Court
and wanted to test an iteration of the public use doctrine different
from prevailing federal doctrine.489 And many succeeded to curtail
perceived threats to core property rights.490
B. Background Principles Are Fertile Ground for Divergence
The Takings Clause functions to protect owners of private property against unlawful invasion and dispossession of their property
by the state. In this context, “unlawful” means without some public
use justification and just compensation.491 It follows that the lawfulness of a dispossession of a property interest is generally created in
the first instance by reference to state background property law.492
reasons traditionally associated with federalism); Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 389–404 (1997) (exploring frequently cited arguments in support of federalism); David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism,
118 HARV. L. REV. 2544, 2551–60 (2005) (categorizing the major strains of federalism theory).
488
Chemerinsky, supra note 487, at 1324–25; Friedman, supra note 487, at
389–404.
489
See supra Part II and accompanying text.
490
See supra Part III for a discussion of state judicial and legislative resistance.
491
Rubenfeld, supra note 267, at 1081–82 (1993) (“While the legislative history of the Compensation Clause is sparse, on one point there is no historical
doubt: from the beginning of the republic to the present, the ‘sacred principle of
compensation’ has always been understood paradigmatically to express the state’s
obligation to indemnify owners of property taken through an assertion of eminent
domain.”).
492
See, e.g., Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 164 (1998) (“Because the Constitution protects rather than creates property interests, the existence
of a property interest is determined by reference to ‘existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law.’” (quoting Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972))); Young, supra note 101, 423–24
(2007). Young makes this analogy to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the ADEA,
and the ADA to show how protections and relief from discrimination based on
race, gender, age, or disability are often sought—and more easily challenged—by
way of federal statutes codifying such substantive individual rights protections
than through the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. Young, supra note
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Justice Scalia famously reiterated these principles in his Lucas opinion, explaining that “[a]ny limitation so severe cannot be newly legislated . . . but must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that
background principles of the State’s law of property and nuisance
already place upon land ownership.”493 Property protections derived
from the federal Takings Clause are dependent on extracanonical
sources, such as state property rights, that have been created by state
courts and state legislatures.494 Thus, the “Supreme Court cannot develop a comprehensive national takings standard.”495 State actors
“are unrepresentative of the nation as a whole” and, therefore, attempts at following a national takings standard could create disharmony, or “disconnects between state policies, state law, and state
judicial interpretation.”496 As a result, states attempting uniformity
across the nation and conformity up the vertical ladder risk making
an already confusing regulatory takings doctrine impossible. Divergence is healthy in our federalist regime, and constitutional property
is fertile grounds for such parting from federal commands.
Independent rulemaking by states offers a healthier dose of legitimacy than following lockstep rules established by nine Justices
from above. Independence is healthy, especially with the muddle of
regulatory takings. Perhaps independent strokes of genius by state
supreme courts will influence federal courts, rather than the other
way around. Constitutional property seems particularly ripe for divergence at the state level given the nature of background state law
principles involved with property. Further, as noted earlier, the Supreme Court in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries took its
cue on public use from state courts’ interpretations of the Takings
Clause. In other words, states influenced the Court’s doctrine as
much as the Court influenced states in other areas of the law. If states

101, at 423–25; see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION:
RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 21–29 (1990) (describing President
Franklin Roosevelt’s “second Bill of Rights” and the “rights revolution” of the
1960s and 1970s as examples of the federal government conferring a wide range
of entitlements on individuals in areas that had traditionally come under states’
police powers).
493
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992).
494
Young, supra note 101, at 425.
495
Sterk, supra note 21, at 206.
496
See Dodson, supra note 1, at 746–47.
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diverge from the Court’s rubrics, like they did after Kelo, then perhaps such cooperation—or “controlled experimentation”—will likewise carve out an alternative regulatory takings doctrine that the Supreme Court might find persuasive. 497
States can and should legislate in a manner that diverges from
analogous constitutional provisions,498 such as expanding property
protections beyond the federal minima.499 In many cases, it is imperative to depart from federal doctrine, as most land use decisions
are made at the local level and state courts are, for the most part, the
first line of defense against “overly burdensome land use regulations.”500 But more to the point, attempts at conforming to the
Court’s doctrinal rubrics may be nothing more than trying to fit a
square peg in a round hole.
C. States’ Embrace of New Federalism in Takings
Divergence also fits neatly in the broader conceptions of New
Federalism, a movement spurred by Justice Brennan that urges state
courts to play a greater role in controlling the protection of constitutional rights by relying on state constitutions as more effective guarantors of individual rights than the United States Constitution.501
Where state courts think protections are inadequate, they can expand
protections. If legislatures, responding to their electorates’ will, impose new tests for regulations that burden private property, then doing so should be welcomed as a reprieve from arguably failed federal doctrine. This is a prominent mode of thinking that envisions
the Republic evolving through a well-refined federalist system.502
As part of the evolution of federalism, supporters of New Federalism have argued that state constitutions ought to serve as the primary
497

Glenn S. Koppel, Toward a New Federalism in State Civil Justice: Developing a Uniform Code of State Civil Procedure Through a Collaborative RuleMaking Process, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1176 (2005) (conceptualizing state collaboration to form new state civil procedure).
498
See Dodson, supra note 1, at 751.
499
See, e.g., id. at 741–42 (noting, for example, that some states diverged from
the federal Defense of Marriage Act by expanding same-sex rights under state
law).
500
Sterk, supra note 21, at 205–06.
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Gardner, Failed Discourse, supra note 80, at 762–63, 771–74.
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See id. at 763, 771–74, 812.
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protectors of individual rights, calling on states to provide greater
protections to individual liberties.503
Justice Brennan, acknowledging a gravitational influence of the
federal Constitution, noted that even though state constitutions often
had similar or even identical language, some state courts occasionally deviated from the Supreme Court’s doctrinal tests.504 Such divergence potentially raises disharmony concerns, as mentioned in
Part III, because the “meaning between words which are the same
in both the federal and state constitutions” may garner different analysis.505 But, as the Supreme Court of Hawaii has noted, “the system
of federalism envisaged by the United States Constitution tolerates
such divergence where the result is greater protection of individual
rights under state law than under federal law.”506 In other words,
according to Justice Brennan, protections for individual liberties
were best executed under state constitutional provisions when federal protection is weakened.507 Justice Brennan even called for state
judges to critically evaluate federal rulings before applying the federal courts’ reasoning to their state constitutions.508
But, as explained, this New Federalism has not necessarily borne
out in the takings context. The Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence tends to evoke a magnetic force that lures states into its orbit,
with widespread conformity. Yet, the Kelo backlash is a nod to the
New Federalism movement, as states resisted the Court’s doctrinal
precedent and instead embarked on a different path.509 That path has
led to the transformation of the home into a mainstay reason for political and doctrinal divergence. It is also the reason why greater protections have been granted to those who are single-parcel homeowners, as opposed to owners of commercial property or undeveloped
land.510
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D. Are State Courts Moving Towards Divergence?
Are there signs that a Kelo-like countervailing force departing
from regulatory takings doctrine is afoot? The prospect of a Kelolike countervailing force against the Supreme Court’s regulatory
muddle might be brewing at the state level. This is a good thing. The
Phillips court’s concerns that state divergence from federal takings
doctrine might “increase uncertainty for litigants attempting to bring
claims under both the federal and state constitutions” may not necessarily bear out at the state level.511 Recall the exploration into reasons why disequilibrium between public use and regulatory takings
doctrine exists post-Kelo in Part III. It may have something to do
with the political economy and the profile (and property interest) of
the litigant bringing the suit against the government. Litigants who
are homeowners succeed in challenging takings at rates far higher
than litigants who are developers.512 If state courts are ruling in favor
of homeowners more often than developers, then an adverse decision by the Supreme Court that underprotects a homeowner, similar
to the ruling that underprotected Ms. Kelo, might trigger a divergence in the regulatory vein. Why wouldn’t it?
A Supreme Court decision rejecting a homeowner’s regulatory
takings claim in favor of the government would arguably clash with
state court preferences for favoring plaintiff homeowners over developers. However, resistance to federal regulatory takings doctrine,
similar to that experienced under the federal public use doctrine, will
probably not occur at the state level until a case comes before the
Supreme Court where the Court’s ruling underprotects a homeowner
from a regulation. With the right litigant profile and the right story,
such a case could rupture the state conformity to federal regulatory
takings like Kelo ruptured federal public use doctrine and economic
development takings. While very few states have enacted statutes
that offer more protections from regulatory takings beyond the federal takings doctrine,513 it is still possible that a regulation that goes
too far in underprotecting a homeowner could spark a Kelo-like
backlash.
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CONCLUSION
This Article has explored the interplay between state conformity
and state resistance to federal constitutional property doctrine. This
phenomenon can be found in both veins of the Takings Clause,
where a certain force of the federal regulatory takings and public use
doctrines has led state actors, historically, to uniformly follow and
apply the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. State actors rarely resisted
or diverted from the high court’s doctrinal script. However, convergence was disrupted by the Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo, which
caused a countervailing force that resisted the federal public use
doctrine. The response was counterintuitive in light of the historical
attraction of the public use doctrine. The result was a seismic rupture
that caused a disequilibrium in constitutional property. This has created a unique distinction in constitutional property where the majority of states have uniformly resisted parts of the federal public use
doctrine, specifically economic development takings, while continuing to embrace federal regulatory takings jurisprudence lockstep.
There are a plethora of reasons for why this might be, but the political economy is the most persuasive.
Today, constitutional property lives in a state of disequilibrium.
Moving forward, it seems that a return to a state of equilibrium may
require the Supreme Court to hand down a regulatory takings ruling
that states would perceive to underprotect core property rights of
homeowners, as opposed to developers, which would trigger a familiar backlash that might result in major countervailing doctrinal
and legislative changes at the state level. Time will tell if, or when,
we see the current gap in constitutional property doctrine close.

